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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The 1990s gave momentum to the Child Justice Movement motivated by the need for a separate 
criminal justice system to deal with juvenile delinquency. The movement’s focus was on law 
reform, child detention, and restorative justice.  
International instruments endorsed by South Africa contributed to the promulgation of 
children’s rights under the Constitution. The Constitution brought about change regarding the 
treatment of juvenile delinquents in conflict with the law. Section 28 emphasises that the best 
interests of the child is of paramount importance, apropos of every matter that affects the child, 
including detention.  
The main objective of the CJA is to divert juvenile delinquents away from the criminal justice 
system by means of restorative justice conditioning to prevent re-offending.  However, the CJA 
acknowledges that diversion may be unsuitable, inadequate, and unsuccessful, hence the 
creation of child justice courts to sentence juvenile delinquents. 
The CJA does not only set out the rights of children, but also it lays down when imprisonment 
may occur, the various sentences that may be imposed, and the benefits of treating children 
differently from adults. The guiding principle behind the CJA is that children should not be 
treated more severely than adults; and one must have regard to international instruments which 
state that detention should always be a measure of the last resort and for the shortest possible 
period. 
Despite these fundamental legislative changes, the research has indicated that the majority of 
sentencers have imposed lengthy detention sentences for juveniles who have committed serious 
crimes in violation of the constitutional principle that juvenile detention must be a measure of 
last resort and for the shortest possible period.  It was found that the principle: ‘juvenile 
detention should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period’ is not only 
5 
 
vague, but creates inconsistency during sentencing because of its inability to give objective 
sentencing guidelines and the operation of excessively wide judicial discretion. This results to 
numerous appeals and reviews of sentences, while children’s rights are not upheld in the most 
stringent manner as required by the Constitution and international instruments.  
These juvenile rights violations can be attributed to the fact that the seriousness of the offence 
was found to be overemphasised at the expense of the youthfulness of the accused. 
Furthermore, it was found that there is little deviation in the length of sentences imposed under 
the CJA and that of the CPA. Similarly, there seems to be little deviation between the sentences 
imposed on juveniles and those that are imposed on adults. All the while restorative justice is 
ignored.  
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate the legislative sentencing principles for juveniles 
aged 14 years and older who have committed serious crimes.  This dissertation questioned 
whether the constitutional entrenchment of juvenile rights and the promulgation of the CJA 
had made any substantial difference in the types of sentences and sentence duration imposed 
on juveniles who commit serious crimes. 
It was recommended that the legislature should provide an objective juvenile sentencing 
guideline to limit the operation of excessively wide judicial discretion and combat the 
vagueness sentencers experience of the principle that juvenile detention should be a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest possible period.  The Dutch are renowned worldwide for their 
liberal sentencing regime promoting restorative justice practices. Hence, it was recommended 
that the legislature should opt to create an objective juvenile sentencing guideline which is 
based on the Dutch bos-polaris sentencing guidelines.   
Furthermore, it was recommended that restorative justice sentences should be emphasised and 
endorsed amongst sentencers. The CJA is primarily based on the premise that restorative justice 
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will allow for the rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile offenders. This premise is 
supported by academics who have frequently asserted that juveniles are more prone to 
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Juvenile Justice, 29 November 1985  
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appropriate sentence to the sentencer 
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CPA:   Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
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UNGPJD:  United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, 
14 December 1990 
UNRPJDL:  United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty, 14 December 1990 





1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1. Outline of Research Problem  
South Africa, as with other foreign jurisdictions, has developed a piece of legislation which 
deals primarily with juveniles in conflict with the law. The purpose of this research is to 
investigate the standard of sentence consistency imposed by the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 
(hereafter the CJA) when sentencing juveniles: those who have been convicted of serious 
crimes according to the international standards endorsed by South African law that ‘juvenile 
detention should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period.’ The researcher 
will examine some of the arguments proposed by academic commentators in relation to the 
operation of the CJA.1 More specifically, the researcher will consider the typical factual 
scenarios in which the operation of minimum and mandatory sentences of s 51(6) of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (hereafter the CLAA) is consulted by sentencers 
before imposing a sentence on a juvenile. The researcher will then continue to consider whether 
the recent case law in the sentencing of juveniles for serious offences in accordance with the 
principle of ‘juvenile detention as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period’ 
may require a separate sentencing guideline to be used by sentencers for juveniles in conflict 
with the law. This possible need will be examined in the light of continuous appeal and review 
of sentences imposed by trial courts.  
In short, the researcher will examine whether it will be feasible and constitutionally correct to 
suggest a sentencing guideline which may be utilised by sentencers when imposing consistent 
and alternative restorative sentences for serious offences committed by juveniles.  
                                                 
1 Act 75 of 2008 (hereafter the CJA) 
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1.2. Rationale for the Study 
The rationale for the study is the investigation of the inconsistency which courts have 
demonstrated during the sentencing of juvenile delinquents convicted of serious crimes; this in 
light of the principle of ‘juvenile detention should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
possible period.’ A further issue will be whether a sentencing guideline is necessary, apropos 
of recent developments. Positive steps have been taken by the courts, assessing the underlying 
intention of the principle that ‘juvenile detention should be a measure of last resort and for the 
shortest possible period.’ This intends to create sentencing consistency and the application of 
restorative justice, by proper calculation of the seriousness of the offence, the harm incurred, 
and the mitigating and aggravating factors of each case.  
1.3. Research Questions 
This dissertation seeks to examine the standard of sentence consistency the CJA2 provides 
within the South African context.  
The researcher seeks to answer the question of whether the international principle that ‘juvenile 
detention should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period’ is an efficient 
and effective sentencing guideline in itself. This possibility will be examined in conjunction 
with case law illustrating the difficulty experienced by sentencers when assessing the vague 
and ambivalent principle that ‘juvenile detention for juvenile delinquents should be a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest possible period of time.’    
Furthermore, the research will seek to answer the question whether South Africa is in need of 
a sentencing guideline to assist sentencers when sentencing juvenile delinquents convicted of 
serious crimes.  
                                                 
2 Act 75 of 2008 
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The research will go further by investigating the Dutch bos-polaris sentencing guidelines. The 
research will seek to answer whether such a sentencing guideline will sufficiently assist the 
sentencer to sentence the juvenile delinquent consistently and according to restorative justice 
practices, while being able to individualise each case by means of the point system equation. 
In essence, the research questions posed by the study are: 
 Does the CJA provide the assurance of sentence consistency within trial courts? 
 Is the international principle that ‘juvenile detention should be a measure of last resort 
and for the shortest possible period’ a consistent sentencing guideline in itself? 
 Is South Africa in need of a sentencing guideline to assist sentencers when sentencing 
juvenile delinquents convicted of serious crimes? 
 Will the Dutch bos-polaris sentencing guideline sufficiently assist the sentencer to 
sentence the juvenile delinquent consistently and according to restorative justice 
practices, while being able to individualise each case by utilising the point system 
equation? 
1.4. Background Information 
The 1990s gave momentum to the Child Justice Movement motivated by the need for a separate 
criminal justice system to deal with juvenile delinquency.3 The movement’s focus was on law 
reform, child detention, and restorative justice.4  
International instruments endorsed by South Africa contributed to the promulgation of 
children’s rights under the Constitution.5 These international instruments, namely the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of a Child,6 United Nations Convention on the Rights of a 
                                                 
3 A Skelton ‘A Long and Winding Road’ (2008) 25  SA Crime Quarterly 2 
4 Ibid 
5 CR Van Eeden An analysis of the legal response to children who commit serious crimes in South Africa 
(Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2013)  37 
6 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of a Child OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) 
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Child,7 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,8 United Nations 
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty,9 and Beijing Rules,10 provide a 
general framework.  Juvenile justice should operate within such a framework, while 
encouraging constant assessment and development of such systems to adapt and evolve to fully 
meet children’s rights.11 These instruments all share a common objective, requiring detention 
for juvenile delinquents to be a ‘measure of the last resort and for the shortest possible period.’ 
The Constitution12 brought about change regarding the treatment of juvenile delinquents in 
conflict with the law. Section 28 emphasises that “the best interests of the child is of paramount 
importance, apropos of every matter that affects the child, including detention.”  
The CJA13 was promulgated to create a separate criminal justice system aligned with the rights 
and needs of juvenile delinquents, coming into effect in 2010. According to the CJA,14 “a child 
is any person under the age of 18 years and, in certain circumstances, a person who is 18 years 
or older, but under the age of 21 years.”15 The main objective of the CJA16 is to divert juvenile 
delinquents away from the criminal justice system by means of restorative justice conditioning 
to prevent re-offending.17  However, the CJA18 acknowledges that diversion may be unsuitable, 
inadequate, and unsuccessful, hence the creation of child justice courts to sentence juvenile 
delinquents.19 
                                                 
7 United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child, 20 November 1989 
8 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, 14 December 1990 
9 United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, 14 December 1990 
10 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 29 November 1985 
11 CR Van Eeden An analysis of the legal response to children who commit serious crimes in South Africa 
(Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2013)  15 
12 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
13 Act 75 of 2008 
14 S 1 of Act 75 of 2008 
15 S 1 of Act 75 of 2008 
16 S1 Act 75 of 2008 
17 SS Terblanche ‘The Child Justice Act: A detailed consideration of section 68 as a point of departure with respect 
to the sentencing of young offenders’ (2012) 67 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  2 
18 S 1Act 75 of 2008 
19Terblanche (note 17 above) 
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The CJA20 does not only set out the rights of children, but also it lays down when imprisonment 
may occur, the various sentences that may be imposed, and the benefits of treating children 
differently from adults.21 The guiding principle behind the CJA22 is that children should not be 
treated more harshly than adults; and one must have regard to international instruments which 
state that ‘detention should always be a measure of the last resort and for the shortest possible 
period.’23 
The CJA24 operates independently and parallel with the CLAA25 in terms of s 51(626) and s 
276.27 The minimum and mandatory sentences clause as contained in s 51(6) does not apply to 
juvenile delinquents below the age of 16 years.28 However, it allows for the imposition of 
detention sentences on juveniles between 17 to 18 years of age, should the sentencer be satisfied 
that facts of the case call for such application; with the proviso that sentencers record their 
reasons, justifying sentencing.29  
Literature review suggests that the principle of ‘juvenile detention should be a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest possible period’ is not only vague: it creates inconsistency during 
sentencing owing to its inability to give objective sentencing guidelines, granting excessively 
wide judicial discretion.30 This results in numerous appeals and reviewing of sentences, while 
                                                 
20 Act 75 of 2008 
21 Act 75 of 2008  
22 Act 75 of 2008 
23 S 68 of Act 75 of 2008; SS Terblanche ‘The Child Justice Act: A detailed consideration of s 68 as a point of 
departure with respect to the sentencing of young offenders’ (2012) 67 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  
24 Act 75 of 2008  
25 Act 105 of 1997 
26 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
27 Act 105 of 1997 
28 CR Van Eeden An analysis of the legal response to children who commit serious crimes in South Africa 
(Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2013) 26 
29 Ibid; S v Blaauw 2001 (2) SACR 255 (CC); S v Nkosi 2002 (1) SACR 135 (W)  
30 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing a child who murders – DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 (1) SACR 243 (SCA)’ (2007) 




children’s rights are not upheld in the most stringent manner as required by the Constitution 
and by international instruments.  
This study will investigate the standard of sentence consistency applied by sentencers in 
accordance with the CJA31 and their ability to sentence juvenile delinquents who have been 
convicted of serious crimes according to international standard of ‘juvenile detention as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period.’ Therefore, a possible overall 
sentencing guideline system will be investigated which might assist sentencers faced with the 
difficult task of sentencing a child. 
In order to understand the future, one has to understand the past. Hence, the study will examine 
case law and the application of the CJA,32 seeking inadequacies faced during sentencing. The 
existence of the current legislation applicable to children may either hinder or facilitate further 
sentencing guidelines for juvenile delinquencies. This research serves as motivation to 
investigate the CJA,33 and the CPA,34 providing necessary rules for strategically dealing with 
this problematic area. 
The complexity of sentencing juvenile delinquents is a constant challenge which varies on an 
ad hoc basis and is an ever-evolving area of study. There are no definite structured sentencing 
guidelines. Each case requires individualisation owing to unique facts and circumstances. This 
study seeks to develop a basic sentencing guideline for juveniles in conflict with the law, 
according to their specific needs, characteristics, and rights.  
                                                 
31 Act 75 of 2008 
32 Act 75 of 2008 
33 Act 75 of 2008 
34 Act 105 of 1997 
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1.5. Research Methodology and Ethical Issues 
The research design utilised is desktop research, which relies on secondary data.35 Secondary 
data are already in existence and need not be collected by the researcher.36  Secondary data 
sources include government publications, published or unpublished information available from 
either within or outside the organisation, data available from previous research, online data, 
case studies, library research, and the Internet in general.37  
The following chapter will seek to provide an overview of the youth-sentencing policy 
applicable in South Africa and the Netherlands.  It will also consider the challenges that 









                                                 
35 U Sekaran & R Bougie Research Methods for Business 6 ed (2013) 115. 
36 Ibid  
37 Ibid  
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2. CHAPTER 2: YOUTH SENTENCING POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA  
2.1. Introduction 
Sentencing is considered the most challenging phase of the criminal procedure, especially when 
sentencing juvenile delinquents: special considerations are involved; and the law extends a 
measure of sympathy for juvenile immaturity.38 Sentencing is “an action by a formal court of 
imposing the most appropriate sentence.”39 Therefore, a sentence is “an order of court that 
finalises the criminal case against the offender.”40 The sentence imposed is consequently the 
closest the public will come to observing the law in action.41  
The South African Law Reform Commission held that for a sentencing system to be supreme 
it must promote consistency, allow for victim participation, and enact restorative justice.42   
2.2. Purposes of punishment 
Punishment generally involves a measure of discomfort.43  Sentencing is generally aimed at 
punishing the offender for the crime committed.44 Therefore, punishment must be structured in 
such a manner that will have the offender realise the nature and degree of the offence 
committed; while allowing him to atone and rehabilitate his character. Sentencing is largely 
based on four purposes of punishment.45 
                                                 
38 SS Terblanche ‘Judgements on sentencing: Leaving a lasting legacy’(2013) 76 THRHR 95 
39 S Hoctor Setencing (Unpublished lecture notes, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2015) 
40 Ibid  
41 SS Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 113 
42 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing guidelines for South Africa: Lessons from elsewhere’ (2003) 120 SALJ 858 
43 Hoctor (note 39 above) 
44 Ibid  
45 Ibid  
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2.2.1. Deterrence  
The primary function of punishment is to prevent reoffending.46 Deterrence operates against 
an individual (aimed at the primary offender) and for the general good (society as a whole)47. 
2.2.1.1. Individual 
Individual deterrence operates as a warning mechanism, operating as it does on the premise of 
preventing crime by the imposition of a penal sentence on a specific offender due to their fear 
that the unpleasant experience of his punishment will reoccur.48 A prime example of individual 
deterrence is a suspended sentence. The theory of individual deterrence is flawed to some 
degree − hardened criminals have become accustomed to the severity of punishment imposed, 
which does not deter them from reoffending.49 The theory also fails to take account of 
premeditated crimes, in which the offender knowingly commits the offence, reconciling 
himself to the punishment that will follow.   
2.2.1.2. General 
General deterrence aims to deter society as a whole from perpetrating crimes since the sentence 
is utilised as a scare-tactic to other potential offenders.50 The success of general deterrence is 
said not to be based only on the severity of the sentence imposed but rather on the great 
possibility of arrest, conviction, and the predetermined sentence imposed.  It is thus submitted 
that the major deterrent effect in our legal system “is not the degree of the punishment, but 
rather the certainty that punishment will follow.”51 South African courts generally assume that 
their sentences will deter other potential offenders and the higher the sentence, the greater the 
deterrent value, however, Terblanche asserts that not every sentence needs to deter potential 
                                                 
46 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing guidelines for South Africa: Lessons from elsewhere’ (2003) 120 SALJ 858 
47 Ibid  
48 SS Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 177 
49 S v B 1996 (2) SACR 543 (C) at para 555b-c; S v Stephen 1994 (2) SACR 163 (W) at para 168h 
50 Terblanche (note 46 above: 172) 
51 Ibid 173 
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offenders.52  The theory of general deterrence is flawed to a degree, based as it is on the 
principle that all people are rational human beings who weigh the advantages against the 
disadvantages of their actions.53 Research indicated that the “deterrence cannot be accepted as 
a fact.”54  In S v Makwanyane55 the court mentioned that research based on the deterrent effect 
of the death penalty have been inconclusive, since only those who were not deterred enter the 
statistics; while the number who were deterred are unknown. In S v Skenjana56 the court held 
that there is no reason to believe that the “deterrent effect of a prison sentence is always 
proportionate to its length.” While in S v Sibeko57 the court held that magistrates often 
complain that crime continues regardless of increased sentences.  Terblanche asserts that this 
is “a realisation that proves the inability of increased punishment to counter crime would 
prevent thinking that there is reason for a further increase in punishment.”  
2.2.2. Prevention / Incapacitation    
The aim of punishment is the preventing of the offender from reoffending, primarily by his or 
her imprisonment.58 Prevention in the broader scope includes deterrence and rehabilitation.59 
The theory of prevention differs from that of deterrence. Deterrence aims at creating 
psychological fear amongst society, thereby preventing offending; while prevention aims to 
disable the offender from reoffending. Thus, the primary sentence option operating under the 
theory of punishment is imprisonment. The theory of prevention is flawed to a degree: 
establishing whether an offender will reoffend on release of sentence served or early parole is 
difficult to near impossible. 
                                                 
52 SS Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 172, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 (2) SACR 
567 (SCA) at para 22, S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at para 123 
53 Ibid  
54 Beyleveld A bibliography on general deterrence (1990)   
55 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at para 182 and 202 
56 1985 (3) SA 51 (A) at 541-5A  
57 1995 (1) SACR 186 (W) at para 191d-e 
58 S Hoctor Sentencing (Unpublished lecture notes, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2015) 
59 Terblanche (note 52 above: 177); S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at para 169.  
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2.2.3. Rehabilitation  
The aim of punishment is the reconditioning of the offender’s character to prevent reoffending, 
allowing reintegration into society as a law-abiding citizen.60 Rehabilitation works better for 
first-time offenders and juvenile delinquents than for habitual offenders. Terblanche asserts 
that rehabilitation would be most successful where: 
 “The crime was caused by a known condition;”  
 “Treatment of such conditions is well known; and” 
 “Likelihood of success of treatment must be considered, and its extent not left to 
conjecture.”61 
In S v De Klerk62 it was held that “a paedophilia cannot be cured, but that such offenders can 
be rehabilitated.” However many sentencers will be reluctant to accept this, as the idea of 
rehabilitation without cure is a foreign concept for most.63  
Recent precedence have held that, rehabilitation became an insignificant consideration in 
relation to the seriousness of the offence which justify lengthy imprisonment sentences, as was 
held in S v Mhlakaza64 which stated that “the object of a long prison sentence is  not 
rehabilitation but the removal of that offender from society.” 
Imprisonment sentences impose an additional risk of exposing the offender to the negative 
effects of the penal system, essentially creating a greater offender, while the immediate 
advantage of protecting the community is short-lived.65  Should the offender attend and 
                                                 
60 S Hoctor Sentencing (Unpublished lecture notes, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2015); S v Makwanyane 1995 
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61 Momoti, V.L. Application of Prescribed Minimum and Mandatory Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile 
Offenders in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005) 20 
62 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) at para 8 
63 SS Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 179 
64 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA) at para 519h-i 
65 Terblanche (note 63 above; 180); S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) at para 8 
24 
 
cooperate with the treatment programs, the likelihood of reoffending will be reduced66.  
However, family support and employment is essential for the successful rehabilitation of the 
offender.67     
An important condition of rehabilitation was highlighted in S v Nkambule,68 where the court 
held that rehabilitation can only be considered as an important sentencing option if the offender 
is willing and able to be rehabilitated.   
The theory of rehabilitation is flawed to a degree. It is difficult to establish how long 
rehabilitative treatment may be necessary. The theory does not adhere to the principle of 
proportionality between the harm caused by the offender and the punishment imposed on such 
an offender.  
2.2.4. Retribution  
The aim of punishment is to avenge the wrong committed against society by inflicting a 
sanction on the offender.69 The theory of retribution is flawed in that it ignores the causes or 
motives of the crime and the potential of rehabilitation and reintegration. The theory has an 
unbalanced approach and application of the principle of proportionality, punishment being 
severe in relation to the crime perpetrated. 
2.3. Principles of Sentencing 
2.3.1. Sentencing discretion  
The sentencer is tasked to individualise a sentence according to his best attempt at the 
evaluation and application of the relevant facts, sentencing principles, and appropriateness of 
                                                 
66 SS Terblanche Guide to sentencing in South Africa 2ed (2007) 180; S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) at 
para 8 
67 Ibid; S v De Klerk 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) at para 8 
68 1993 (1) SACR 136 (A) at para 147f. 
69 Momoti, V.L. Application of Prescribed Minimum and Mandatory Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile 
Offenders in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005) 20 
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sentences.70 Essentially, sentencing discretion presupposes that no single correct sentence 
exists.71  
Sentencing is complex in nature owing to each case’s having a unique set of facts, sentencing 
factors, and features that will influence the sentence imposed.72 The sentencer is tasked to 
determine which of the facts, factors, and features are relevant to the sentence, accordingly 
assigning weight to each of them.73 Thereafter, the sentencer has to decide whether the offender 
should be removed from society, all the while considering the extent of the sentence by 
determining whether the sentence should be suspended. If so, it must be made plain for how 
long and under which conditions.74 Thus the exercising of sentencing discretion is extremely 
precarious.  
The Constitutional Court has acknowledged that the principle of sentencing discretion has led 
to a measure of inconsistency in the sentences imposed by our courts. The case of S v Thebus75 
is a prime example of such inconsistency. One sentencer imposed an eight-year imprisonment 
sentence, fully suspended, conditional on community service; while the majority judgement 
imposed a 15-year imprisonment sentence. This indicates an excessively wide range of 
sentences for one case.  
Sentencing discretion must be exercised reasonably and properly. The test for reasonableness 
is whether the trial sentencer would reasonably have imposed the sentence; while properness 
is the absence of substantial misdirection on the part of the sentencer.76  
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Terblanche argued that sentencing discretion is valuable, sentencers being equipped with 
analytical skills to actively determine an appropriate sentence.77 The most valued characteristic 
of sentencing discretion is the ability to individualise a sentence according to unique facts of 
the case, with regard for the offender, the crime, and the presence or absence of mitigating and 
aggravating factors. 
However, Terblanche noted that wide sentencing discretion could be harmful. This would 
enable personal perspectives to dominate the sentencing phase, causing sentence inconsistency, 
prejudice, or excessive mercy, which is a direct infringement of the right to equality.78 Sentence 
inconsistency leads to uncertainty regarding the outcome of criminal cases, which is why it 
may be described as a direct violation of the principle of legal certainty. 
The functional value of sentencing discretion is that it allows similar cases to be treated alike. 
It also allows for the offenders of serious crimes to be sentenced more severely than those of 
minor crimes.79 This, however, does not presuppose that identical sentences must be imposed. 
The ideal is to strive for an endorsement of basic sentencing consistency.  
In S v Giannoulis80, the court held that an appeal court will be justified in interfering with a 
sentence if it found that the sentence imposed was disturbingly inappropriate, owing to great 
disparity between the sentences imposed by the court a quo and that regarded appropriate by 
the court of appeal. The court went further, encouraging appeal courts not to standardise the 
sentences, but rather to individualise the sentences according to it considers appropriate to the 
circumstances.  
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Sentencing discretion is not unlimited. Ashworth asserted that there are four methods to limit 
the scope of sentencing discretion, namely, judicial self-regulation, statutory sentencing 
principles, numerical guidelines (Dutch bos-polaris sentencing guidelines), and minimum and 
mandatory sentencing legislation (s 51 of CLAA).81 Ashworth’s fourth technique, minimum 
and mandatory sentencing legislation, has now been firmly entrenched in the South African 
legal system. 
Our criminal courts and its sentencers operate on the practice of judicial self-regulation, which 
has seen reasonable success.82 Appeal and review courts utilise four basic principles to 
determine whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was proper and reasonable:83 
 Proportionality: “An evaluation of the nature and seriousness of the crimes, the rights 
of the offender, and the interests of society are balanced in seeking an appropriate 
sentence;”84 
 S v Malgas85 held that a sentencer should not readily depart from the prescribed 
minimum sentences in CLAA,86 unless substantial and compelling circumstances are 
present; 
 S v Xaba87held that a sentencer should actively consult and consider previous sentences 
imposed for similar offences; and 
 S v Brandt88held that a sentencer should be vigilant when sentencing juvenile 
delinquents, taking cognisance of the best interests of the child.  
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2.3.2. The triad of Zinn   
South African criminal law attempted to simplify the sentencing process with the trite principle 
of proportionality and balance that was formulated in S v Zinn.89 The Zinn case90 emphasised 
balance which mainly relates to the influence of the nature of the crime. The principle of 
proportionality involves an evaluation of the nature and seriousness of the crimes, the rights of 
the offender and victim, and the interests of society, balanced, in seeking an appropriate 
sentence.91  
The nature and seriousness of the crime assumes an investigation into the degree of 
harmfulness.92 The more serious the offence, the more punitive the sentence should be.93 In 
determining the seriousness of the crime, a two-fold approach is undertaken, namely (1) a 
consideration of the degree of harmfulness and (2) the consideration of the degree of culpability 
of the offender94. The degree of culpability on the part of the offender determines how 
blameworthy his actions were and how severe punishment should be.95 It is a difficult task for 
a sentencer to find a sentence that adequately reflects the seriousness of the crime. Therefore 
sentencers developed a point of departure for the sentences imposed for a specific type of 
offence; and consult society view of the crime. Personal characteristics of the offender are of 
importance, indicating the motive behind the offence, and permitting individualisation 
according to absence or presence of aggravating or mitigating factors.96  
The rights of the offender and victim assume an investigation into many factors such as the 
motive of the offender, age, presence of dependants, level of education, employment and 
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health.97 This leg of the triad allow for individualisation of sentences. Ideally, sentencers should 
become familiar with the character of the offender, which can be done by way of pre-sentencing 
reports. However as character analysis are difficult to establish and sentencers general 
hesitancy regarding the accuracy of presentencing reports,98 sentencers simply attempt to 
determine the culpability of the offender.99   
The interests of society assume an investigation of the reaction of the community to the crime 
committed; and the purpose which the sentence should serve to society.100 However, in S v 
Mhlakaza101 the court held that “the object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion but to 
serve the public interest.” In S v Martin102and S v Manonela103 the courts held that when right-
minded members of society are of the opinion that the offender deserves a severe sentence the 
court should agree with the view only when it considers the view to be, objectively speaking, 
correct.  
The primary aim of proportionality is to achieve justice. Thus the principle of proportionality 
strives for an optimal combination of the three aims. Henceforth it is the court’s obligation to 
impose confidently a fitting sentence. 
2.3.3. Measure of mercy  
This sentencing consideration was articulated in S v Rabie.104 The Court held that:  
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“The measure of mercy depends on the facts of the case, as it is a balanced and humane 
state of thought. It tempers one’s approach to the factors to be considered in arriving 
at the appropriate sentence. It is not common sympathy, as it acknowledges that 
sometimes fair punishment needs to be robust. Essentially, measure of mercy is the 
objective sentencing of a fellow human being, as it aims to avoid severity arising from 
anger or disgust.”105 
2.3.4. Mitigating and aggravating factors  
These factors allow for the individualising of a sentence based on the existence of mitigating 
factors that could justify a lesser sentence, while aggravating factors could justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence.106 There is no complete list of either aggravating or 
mitigating factors.107  
Some of the prominent aggravating factors are:108 
 Seriousness of the crime; 
 Premeditation;  
 Problem-type crimes; 
 Previous convictions; 
 Motive; 
 Lack of remorse; 
 Abuse of trust; 
 Professionalism of criminals; 
 Abuse or exploitation of children; and 
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 Prevalence of crime 
Some of the prominent mitigating factors are:109 
 Dolus eventualis; 
 First-time offender; 
 Youth; 
 Older offender; 
 Ill-health; 
 Family or dependants; 
 Employment; 
 Various mental and emotional factors; 
 Alcohol and drugs; 
 Positive motive; 
 Sub-normal intelligence; 
 Financial need and social status; 
 Actions by groups; 
 Lack of premeditation; and 
 Remorse and plea of guilty. 
2.3.5. Theories of punishment110 
The application of theories of punishment during sentencing is based on the rationale that 
punishment has a social benefit for society; hence it is justified by the advantage it contributes 
to social order.111 
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2.3.6. South African Law Commission Report and Guideline for Sentencing  
This is the guideline set by the Commission to which the sentencer must adhere should the 
offence contain a prescribed penalty (minimum and mandatory sentences),112 which will 
specify the sentencing option and its quantum.113  
2.4. Sentencing options 
Skelton asserts that alternative sentences allow for greater individualisation of sentences as 
they include rehabilitation and reintegration.114  The Department of Correctional Services 
echoed Skelton; noting that alternative sentences are more advantageous than imprisonment 
because the offender is granted the opportunity of remaining in society while deconditioning 
of criminal behaviour occurs.115 This, in turn, limits the detrimental exposure of juveniles to 
prison life, while promoting accountability, promoting family preservation, breaking cycles of 
violence, reducing stigma, demonstrating remorse, making reparation,  and ultimately, 
allowing for ‘real’ justice between the victim and the offender.116 
The Department of Correctional Services must, however, promote alternative sentences, as it 
is wrong to presume that prosecutors and sentencers are cognisant of them.117   
2.4.1. Community-based sentences 
A community-based sentence is allowed for in s 72 of the CJA,118 “which allows a juvenile 
offender to remain within the community.” “Such a sentence includes any options referred to 
in s 53119, as a sentencing option, or any combination thereof; and a sentence involving some 
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form of correctional supervision.”120 The “child justice court that has imposed a community-
based sentence is obliged to request the probation officer concerned to monitor the juvenile 
delinquent’s compliance with the sentence,” while providing the court with progress reports 
indicating such compliance. The sentencer “must warn the juvenile that any compliance failure 
will result in the juvenile delinquent’s being brought back before the child justice court for an 
inquiry in terms of s 79.”121122 Community-based sentences could previously only be imposed 
if they were accompanied by conditions or a suspended sentence; however, the law now allows 
for this sentence to be independently imposed.  
2.4.2. Restorative justice 
Restorative justice is said to be an ideal similar to the concept of justice itself.123 South Africa’s 
Ubuntu principle allows for the application of restorative justice, it being based on the values 
of rehabilitation and reintegration.124 Under s 73 of the CJA125, restorative justice sentences 
allow the court convicting the juvenile delinquent of an offence to sentence the juvenile to 
attend “a family group conference,126 victim-offender mediation127, or any other form of 
restorative justice process in accordance with the definition of restorative justice.”128 The 
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“child justice court that has imposed a restorative justice sentence is obliged to request the 
probation officer concerned to monitor the juvenile delinquent’s compliance with the 
sentence,” while providing the court with progress reports indicating such compliance.129 The 
sentencer must caution the juvenile that any compliance failure “will result in the juvenile 
delinquent being brought back before the child justice court for an inquiry in terms of s 79.”130 
The CJA131 acknowledges that the majority of juvenile delinquents are from the most 
vulnerable and marginalised groups of society; therefore the CJA132 did not exclude serious 
crimes as contained in Schedule 3 of CPA133 from the ambit of restorative justice.134 This does 
not however mean that juveniles from wealthy and highly privileged spheres of life are 
excluded from this sentencing option.  
2.4.3. Fines and alternatives to fines 
This is arguably the sentence most commonly imposed on juvenile delinquents for less serious 
crimes.135 However, s 74(1) of the CJA136obliges a child justice court that has convicted a 
juvenile delinquent of an offence for which a fine is appropriate, to investigate the juvenile or 
and their parents’ financial means, thereby actively determining an appropriate fine or 
repayment method, and whether failure of repayment would result in imprisonment. Section 
74(2)137 allows for several options as alternatives to the imposition of a fine. These options 
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include: symbolic restitution, payment of compensation, service, or benefit, and “any other 
option that the child justice court considers appropriate in the circumstances.”   
2.4.4. Correctional supervision 
Section 75 of the CJA138 allows “a child justice court that convicts a juvenile delinquent of an 
offence to impose a sentence of correctional supervision in terms of s 276(1)(h) of CPA.”139 
Section 1 of CPA140 defines correctional supervision as “a community based sentence to which 
a person is subject in accordance with Chapter V and VI of the Correctional Services Act, 
1998, and the regulations under that act…” 
In S v R141 the court imposed correctional supervision, holding that “correctional supervision 
does not necessarily describe a specific sentence, rather, it is used as a collective term for a 
wide range of measures which may be imposed, all of which must be executed within the 
community.” 
Since it is essentially an imprisonment sentence, it is aimed at serious crimes.142  Therefore, it 
functions as a punishment somewhere between ordinary imprisonment and a sentence which 
does not involve imprisonment.143  
Thus, correctional supervision is a sentence which varies; ultimately restricting freedom of 
movement through house arrest and community service, and the attendance at rehabilitation 
programmes which must all operate within the community in which the juvenile offender finds 
himself.144  
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In S v E145 the court held that community service is not a lenient alternative to imprisonment, 
but rather, a more challenging option to that of ordinary imprisonment: the offender is forced 
to regrow his character within a community, while obeying sentencing orders. The court further 
held that correctional supervision affords the ‘offender a greater scope for regrowth of 
character.’  
Correctional supervision offers several advantages. It is highly punitive, promoting 
rehabilitation; it is also extremely flexible in nature146. Also, the various disadvantages of 
imprisonment are diminished, namely, no exposure to hardened criminals, no isolation, no 
stigma, preventing and alleviating overcrowding. Correctional supervision, in addition, costs 
less than imprisonment.147 
There is no comprehensive list of offences for which correctional supervision may be imposed. 
However, our courts have emphasised on several instances that sentencers must not hesitate to 
impose this sentencing option, even when the conviction was for serious offences,148 as 
correctional supervision primarily deprives the offender of his liberty149 and may be combined 
with conditions and another sentence. Consequently, correctional supervision allows for a truly 
individualised sentence. 
Conditions that may be attached to correctional supervision include, but are not limited to: 
“house detention, community service, employment, payment of compensation or damages, 
treatment-development-and-support programmes, mediation, and family-group conferencing, 
offender contribution towards costs of sentence, restriction to magistrate courts’ districts, 
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living at a fixed address, refraining from using or abusing of drugs or alcohol, refraining from 
committing crimes, instituting monitoring and educational programmes.”150   
In deciding whether to impose correctional supervision, the sentencer is guided by the 
foundational objective of whether an offender should be removed from society or not.151 
Another motivation for correctional supervision is the offender’s ability to reform.152 
Sentencers will, however, take account of whether the offender is a first-time offender, whether 
they are employed and requires to support a family, whether the offender poses a danger to 
society, the type of crime committed, and the presence of youth.153  
Correctional supervision nonetheless has limitations. It may not be imposed for a conviction in 
terms of the minimum and mandatory legislation unless substantial and compelling 
circumstances have been found, nor may it be imposed for a statutory offence, if the statute 
does not allow for imprisonment.154 Furthermore, correctional supervision must be imposed 
for a limited period of time: it cannot exceed a period of 3 years.155  
Terblanche noted that correctional supervision is an ideal sentencing option for alleviating the 
overcrowding of prisons.156 However, the researcher stresses that this sentencing option may 
be viewed as a lenient alternative to imprisonment, owing to a lack of trust which society and 
the judiciary have in the Department of Correctional Services’ ability to implement and report 
on these services efficiently.157   
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2.4.5. Compulsory attendance at a youth centre 
Section 76 of the CJA158 allows “a child justice court that has convicted a juvenile delinquent 
of an offence to impose a sentence of compulsory residence at a child and youth care centre 
providing a programme in terms of s 191(2) (j) of the Children’s Act.”159 The CJA160 expressly 
limits the period of attendance to 5 years, or until the juvenile attains majority at 21, whichever 
date is the earliest. This sentencing option may, however, only be imposed for offences161 
committed in terms of Schedule 3 of the CPA,162 or any offence which, were it “committed by 
an adult, would have justified a period of imprisonment exceeding ten years.” Should there be 
any substantial or compelling reasons, the juvenile delinquent may be sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment after the completion of attendance at the child or youth centre.163 The aim of this 
sentencing option was to allow a juvenile delinquent “under the age of 14 years to be sentenced 
to imprisonment via a youth centre.”164 This sentencing option is highly punitive in nature, 
while its efficacy remains unseen.165  
2.4.6. Imprisonment  
Imprisonment is the “admission into a prison and confinement of an offender in a prison for 
the duration determined by the court or statute.” Section 77 of the CJA166 allows “a child 
justice court that has convicted a juvenile delinquent of an offence to sentence the offender to 
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imprisonment.” However, the CJA167 expressly limits the circumstances in which 
imprisonment may be imposed, namely:  
 “No juvenile under the age of 14 years when they committed the offence may be 
imprisoned;”168  
 “Should the juvenile be 14 years at the time of the commission of the crime, they may 
only be imprisoned as a last-resort measure, and for the shortest possible period;”169 
 “Should the juvenile be  14 years at the time of the commission of the crime, they may 
only be imprisoned if:” 
o “A Schedule 3 offence170has been committed;”171 
o “A Schedule 2 offence172 has been committed, and substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist;”173 and 
o “A Schedule 1 offence174 has been committed, and a record of previous 
convictions and substantial and compelling circumstances exist.”175 
“If the juvenile was 14 years at the time of the commission of the crime, he or she may 
only be imprisoned:” 
o “For a period not exceeding 25 years176;” or 
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o “In terms of s 276(1)(i) CPA a person may be placed under correctional 
supervision.”177 
Furthermore, the child justice court is obliged to take account of the number of days of 
imprisonment the juvenile delinquent served prior to the sentence being imposed,178 and 
qualification for an early release on parole must be an element of imprisonment.179  
The main purposes of punishment is thus to “punish the perpetrator, prevent further crime and 
to rehabilitate the offender.”  However sentencers have expresses an unqualified belief in 
imprisonment as a means of rehabilitating offenders, but many more, while holding a basic 
belief that this could happen acknowledge two doubts: one, whether the Department of 
Correctional Services is able to carry out its functions in such a way to rehabilitate offenders, 
and two, whether the nature of the institution of a prison can assist with rehabilitation, given 
the lack of availability of effective psychological services.180  
Imprisonment has two pivotal advantages: “one, it removes the offender from society, and two, 
it provides a sufficiently severe sentencing option.”181   
However, imprisonment is riddled with grave disadvantages, namely: with regard to financial 
costs, expensive both in terms of maintaining prisoners and loss of potential income the 
offender could have earned.182 Two, with regard to the effect of imprisonment on inmates, 
extensive time (23 hours out of 24 hours) are spent doing nothing, overcrowding and 
unfavourable conditions in prisons, removal of prisoners from ‘normal’ society and placement 
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into an ‘abnormal society’, with results into institutionalization of the offender and lack of 
positive influences.183 
The following chapter will give an overview of s 51-53 of the CLAA,184 and the application of 
minimum and mandatory sentences for juveniles who have been convicted of serious offences. 
The chapter will also consider the challenges that sentencers are likely to face in the 
implementation of this sentencing legislation.  
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3. CHAPTER 3: PROVISIONS OF S 51-53 OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
AMENDMENT ACT 105 OF 1997 
3.1. Introduction 
Generally, the court has wide judicial discretion; however, s 51-53 CLAA185 contains a 
minimum and mandatory sentence provision which attempts to curtail wide judicial discretion 
and its consequences, namely, lack of consistency, and impossibility of determining a basis for 
sentences.186 Section 51-53187 came into operation on 1 May 1998 as a temporary sentencing 
measure.188 However, it has been endorsed by the legislature and has become an integral part 
of the criminal law. Whilst district courts are not affected by this legislation; both high – and 
regional courts are.189  
3.2. Outline and application of the provisions of s 51-53  
The CLAA190 accounts for three types of offenders, namely, “children below the age of 16 
years, children between the ages of 16 and 18 years, and adult offenders.”191  
3.2.1. Section 51(1) 
“notwithstanding any other law but subject to subsections (3) and (6) a high court shall  
a) If it has convicted a person of an offence referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 or; 
b) If the matter has been referred to it under 52(1) for sentence after the person concerned 
has been convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2, 
−  sentence the person to life imprisonment.” 
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Section 51(1)192 applies regardless of any other law. However, if this would lead to an absurd 
result, the position can be affected by certain principles of the interpretation of statutes.193 An 
example of this occurred in S v Shaik194 where the court confirmed that a corporate offender 
can only be sentenced with fines, and that the minimum sentences legislation does not apply.   
Section 51195 operates in conjunction with subsections (3) and (6).  If the provisions of these 
subsections are satisfied, the minimum and mandatory sentence imposition does not apply.   
Subsection (3)(a)196 contains an escape clause. It reinstates the court’s sentencing discretion to 
deviate from the prescribed sentence should the court find “substantial and compelling 
circumstances.” There is no onus on the accused to prove such circumstances, however, should 
they want the sentencer to take cognisance of such circumstances, they must raise them 
accordingly.197 In S v Malgas198 the court held that “prescribed sentences should not be 
departed from lightly, and that such sentences should ordinarily be imposed. However, if 
substantial and compelling circumstances exist, the court should not hesitate to deviate from 
the prescribed sentence.” A prescribed sentence would be disturbingly inappropriate should 
the imposition amount to injustice. The court further held that substantial and compelling 
circumstances are based on a composite and not disjunctive test.  
Subsection (6)199 excludes juveniles if they were “under the age of 16 years at the time of the 
commission of the crime from the imposition of the Act.”200 Hence the general principles 
regarding the sentencing of such juveniles should be followed.201   
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Subsection (3) (b)202 contains a limitation clause because the minimum and mandatory sentence 
legislation does not operate for “children below the age of 16 years.”203  However, should the 
offender be “between 16 to 18 years at the time of the commission of the offence, minimum and 
mandatory sentences generally do not apply; unless the court decides that, based on the facts 
of the case, the provision should apply.”204  This generally occurs when the crime is serious in 
nature, such as rape and murder.  Contrary to the ordinary burden of proof, it is the duty of the 
court to establish whether there are justifiable reasons calling for the application of minimum 
and mandatory legislation for juvenile delinquents aged 16 to 18 years.205  It should, however, 
be noted that the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ requirement has no application 
for juvenile delinquents under the age of 16 years as it would be against the child’s 
constitutional rights to take account of his best interests.206 Hence it is considered that the 
legislature intends the sentencer to impose less severe sentences for juvenile delinquents, unless 
there are aggravating factors sufficiently severe that call for a minimum sentence to be 
imposed.207   
Section 51(7)208 places “an onus on the state to prove the juvenile’s age when the age of the 
juvenile is in dispute.”  
Section 51(1)209 applies to both regional and high courts.210  It requires sentencers to impose 
life imprisonment for the listed offences.211 More specifically it requires a sentencer to impose 
life imprisonment sentences mostly in the case of murder or rape, and in both cases only with 
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respect to situations described, which include premeditated murder in the course of rape, or 
robbery and rape involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm.212  
Section 51(2)213 prescribes the minimum terms of imprisonment which must be imposed. The 
CLAA,214 however, permits the imposition of a further sanction (in combination with the 
minimum sentence that must be imposed), such as a fine or committal to a treatment centre, 
when justified by the facts of the case. Terblanche asserted that s 290 of CLAA215 sanctions 
correctional supervision as an alternative to a minimum imprisonment sentence, since the term 
of ‘imprisonment’ are not limited to ordinary, determinate imprisonment.216  Sentences such as 
declaring an offender a dangerous criminal, or correctional supervision also constitute 
imprisonment in our law.217  
3.3. Interpretation of Section 51-53  
Legislature intended the CLAA218 to be interpreted according to the ordinary principles 
pertaining to statutory penalty clauses.219 The meaning of the words used must be of primary 
importance, balanced with the legislature intention, and in accordance with the spirit, purport, 
and objectives of the Bill of Rights.220  
Legislature has primarily intended the minimum and mandatory legislation to act as a 
deterrent.221 
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The constitutionality of the CLAA222 was unsuccessfully challenged in S v Dodo223. The court 
held that the CLAA224 does not breach the doctrine of separation of powers, as both the 
“legislature and judiciary share an interest in the punishment to be imposed by courts both 
with regard to its nature and its severity.”225 It was also held that the accused’s “right not to be 
punished in a cruel, inhuman, or degrading way must not be infringed”226 referring to the 
Malgas case 227 in which the court held that “a sentencing court is not obliged to impose a 
sentence if substantial and compelling circumstances exist which will render the minimum or 
mandatory sentence disturbingly inappropriate.”228 
Terblanche asserted that youth is an important factor in determining whether substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist.229 The mere fact that the offender is young is not by itself 
considered to be a substantial or compelling circumstance.230 The seriousness of the offence 
and the character of the offender are determinative.231 The fact that separate legal positions 
exist in the operation of minimum and mandatory sentences imposed on offenders below the 
age of 18, and offenders of 18 years and older, is discriminatory.232 In S v Meiring 233the court 
held that it is discriminatory if an 18-year-old accused is sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, 
whereas, had he been 2 days younger at the time of the offence, the sentence would have been 
much less severe. In S v Khoza 234the court held that it was not justified to differentiate in 
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sentencing between the accused A who was 18 years old, and accused B who was 17 years and 
10 months old, although theoretically they fell into different sentencing categories. 
The following chapter will give an overview of the CJA, and will seek to analyse the 
sentencer’s approach to the implementation of this legislation. It will also consider the 










4. CHAPTER 4: THE CHILD JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008 
4.1. Introduction 
The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 came into effect in 2010. It revolutionised the CPA235 with 
the introduction of new criminal justice procedures and concepts which are conducive to 
juvenile rights and needs.236  
The CJA237 was promulgated “to establish a separate criminal justice system for juveniles who 
are in conflict with the law, and are accused of committing offences, in accordance with the 
values fundamental to the Constitution and international instruments. The CJA238 aims to 
provide the minimum age of criminal capacity of children’239 to make provision for the 
assessment of juveniles;240 to provide for the holding of a preliminary inquiry,241 and to 
incorporate the fundamental principle of diversion, which aims to divert juvenile matters away 
from the formal criminal justice system in appropriate circumstances;242 to make special 
provision for securing attendance at court;243 and for the release, detention, or placement of 
juveniles;244 to make provision for child justice courts to hear all trials of juveniles whose 
matters are not diverted;245 to extend the sentencing options available for convicted juveniles; 
and to entrench the notion of restorative justice in the criminal justice system in respect of 
juveniles who are in conflict with the law.”246  
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The CJA247 expressly cautions the relevant parties that detention should be a “measure of last 
resort and for the shortest possible period;”248 juveniles must “be treated in a manner and kept 
in conditions that take account of their age;” juveniles must be “kept separate from adults;” 
and boys must be separated from girls while in detention; juveniles must be protected from 
“maltreatment, neglect, abuse, or degradation; juveniles must not be subjected to practices 
that could endanger the juveniles’ well-being, education, physical or mental health, or 
spiritual, moral, or social development; and current statutory law does not effectively 
approach the plight of juveniles in conflict with the law in a comprehensive and integrated 
manner that takes into account their vulnerability and special needs.” 249 
The CJA250 expressly acknowledges that there are “capacity, resource, and other constraints 
on the state which may require a practical and incremental strategy to implement the new 
criminal justice system for juveniles.”251    
The aim of the CJA252 was to replace the traditional forms of punishment with restorative 
justice principles, encouraging the rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile delinquents.253  
Youth is always considered a mitigating factor owing to its ability to influence the juvenile 
delinquent’s moral culpability, and calls for sentencing treatment other than that of adults.254 
Children require a different sentencing approach. It is recognised that juvenile delinquent 
crimes may stem from immature judgement, an unformed character, youthful vulnerability to 
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error, impulses, and influences.255 The court has recognised in S v M 256 that “demanding full 
moral accountability for an offence might be too harsh on a juvenile, because such offenders 
are not yet adults.” Hence, the law affords juvenile delinquents some leeway of hope and 
possibility.  
4.2. Objects of the CJA 
The objects of the CJA are:257 
 “To protect the rights of juveniles as provided for in the Constitution and international 
instruments;”258 
 “To promote the spirit of Ubuntu in the child justice system through fostering the 
juvenile’s sense of dignity and worth; reinforcing juveniles’ respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms by holding them accountable for their actions, and 
safeguarding the victim and the community; supporting reconciliation based on 
restorative justice practices; involving the affected relevant parties in the procedures 
to ensure the reintegration of juveniles;”259 
 “To provide for the special treatment of juveniles in the child justice system designed  
to prevent reoffending, with the aim of protecting the community and conditioning the 
juveniles to become law-abiding citizens;”260 
 “To prevent juveniles from being exposed to the adverse effects of the formal criminal 
justice system by using appropriate means more suitable to their needs;”261 and 
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 “To promote cooperation between all role-players to ensure an integrated and holistic 
approach in the implementation of the CJA.”262   
4.3. Guiding principles 
The guiding principles of the CJA are: 
 “All consequences arising from the commission of the offence by the juvenile should be 
proportional to the circumstances of the child, the nature of the offence, and the 
interests of society;”263 
 “A juvenile must not be treated more severely than an adult would have been treated 
in the same circumstances;”264 
 “Every juvenile should, as far as possible, be given an opportunity of participating in 
proceedings where decisions affecting him or her might be taken;”265 
 “All procedures should be conducted and completed without unreasonable delay;”266 
and 
 “The rights and obligations of juveniles are contained in international and regional 
instruments, with particular reference to the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.”267  
4.4. Application of the CJA 
Prior to the implementation of the CJA268 the court In S v Kwalase,269 held that the sentencer 
must determine the juvenile delinquent’s moral culpability with reference to his age and 
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maturity at the time of the commission of the crime. Likewise, in S v Blaauw,270 the court held 
that the sentencer must be mindful of the fact that a juvenile may not be immature and still 
developing a day before she/he attains majority; nor does a juvenile become mature and 
developed the day majority has been attained.  
The CJA271 applies to any juvenile “under the age of 18 years and, in certain circumstances, 
this applies to a person who is 18 years or older, but under the age of 21 years.’ 
4.5. Minimum Age of Criminal Capacity 
Criminal capacity is the ability to conduct oneself in line with the appreciation of the 
wrongfulness of one’s conduct.272 
At common law, it is generally recognised that juveniles lack both the intellectual maturity and 
the self-control necessary to be held criminally or delictually accountable for their 
wrongdoing.273 The CJA274 has changed the common law in this regard. 
A juvenile “who is 10 years or younger at the time of the commission of the offence does not 
have criminal capacity.”275 
A juvenile “who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission 
of the offence is presumed to lack criminal capacity, unless the state can prove that he has 
criminal capacity.”276 
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A juvenile who is 14 years or older at the time of the commission of the offence is presumed 
to have criminal capacity.277   
4.6. Diversion 
The CJA278 defines diversion as “a means of diverting a matter involving a juvenile away from 
the formal court procedure in a criminal matter by means of the procedures established by 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 8.”279 
The CJA280 expressly states the objectives of diversion as: 
 “A manner of dealing with a juvenile outside the formal criminal justice in appropriate 
cases;”281 
 “Encouraging accountability on the part of the juvenile;”282 
 “Meeting the particular needs of the individual juvenile;”283 
 “Promoting reintegration into society;”284 
 “Providing an opportunity for the harmed parties to express their views on the impact 
of the crime on them;”285 
 “Encouraging the juvenile to render an appropriate form of restitution to the 
victim;”286 
 “Promoting reconciliation between the juvenile and relevant parties;”287 
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 “Preventing stigmatisation and the adverse effects of the formal criminal justice 
system;”288 
 “Reducing the potential for reoffending;”289 
 “Preventing the juvenile from obtaining a criminal record;”290 and 
 “Promoting the dignity, well-being, and self-worth of the juvenile, and the ability to 
contribute to society.”291 
Diversion allows a prosecutor in terms of s 41(1) of the CJA292 to divert a matter involving a 
juvenile who allegedly committed a Schedule 1 offence.293 In order to determine whether 
diversion will be suitable, a prosecutor must “take account of whether the juvenile has a record 
of previous diversions.”294 Further consideration must be given to whether the juvenile 
“acknowledges responsibility for the offence; whether the juvenile was not unduly influenced 
to acknowledge responsibility; the presence of a prima facie case against the juvenile; and the 
juvenile and his representative’s consent to diversion.”295 Additional consideration will be 
required if the juvenile allegedly committed a Schedule 2296 or Schedule 3297 offence. The 
prosecutor will be tasked with considering the views of the victim and his representative as to 
whether diversion “should be allowed; and if so, the nature and content of the diversion option, 
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in consultation with the police official responsible for the investigation of the case.”298 Should 
the prosecutor find that diversion is unsuitable in a case, he “must immediately make provision 
for the juvenile to appear at a preliminary inquiry.”299  
It should be noted that diversion is seldom used in serious cases. Thus it is essential to ensure 
that all deserving cases are diverted.300  
Section 53 of the CJA301 prescribes the diversion options available to the prosecutor:  
 A compulsory school-attendance order; 
 Family-time order; 
 Good-behaviour order; 
 Peer-association order; 
 Reporting order; or 
 Supervision and guidance order. 
Section 42(1) of the CJA302 requires a diversion to be a made an order of court by the sentencer 
in his chambers in the presence of all relevant parties.   
The failure of a juvenile to comply with a diversion order justifies the issuing of a warrant for 
his arrest, or a summons for the juvenile to appear before the sentencer in a child justice 
court.303 
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Skelton asserts that, owing to the wide discretion to divert cases given to prosecutors and 
sentencers, bifurcation occurs.304 Hence, minor offences are being diverted, while serious cases 
proceed to trial, which place such offenders beyond the reach of restorative justice.305  This can 
easily result in discriminatory practices.306 However, the CJA307 allows diversion to occur at 
three stages, namely: after arrest; at the preliminary enquiry; and during the trial. This is an 
inherent safeguard to prevent discriminatory practices by allowing serious offences also the 
opportunity of being diverted.308  
4.7. Preliminary inquiry 
The CJA309 defines a preliminary inquiry as an “informal pre-trial procedure which is 
inquisitorial in nature, held in a court or any other suitable place, presided over by a 
magistrate of the district within which the juvenile has allegedly committed the offence.”310 
Section 43(2)(a) - (h) of the CJA311 expresses the preliminary inquiry objectives as: 
 “A consideration of the assessment report by the probation officer regarding age, 
criminal capacity, and whether a more detailed assessment of the juvenile is 
required;”  
 “Establishing whether the matter is suitable for diversion;” 
 “Where applicable, the identification of a suitable diversion option;” 
 “Establishing whether the case should be referred to a children’s court;” 
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 “Ensuring all relevant and available information regarding the juvenile is considered 
when making an informed decision regarding diversion;” 
 “Ensuring the views of all affected persons are considered in the decision-making 
process;” 
 “Encouraging participation from the juvenile and his representatives in the decision-
making regarding the juvenile;” and 
 “Determining the release or placement of a juvenile, pending the conclusion of the 
preliminary inquiry, the appearance of the juvenile in the child justice court, or the 
referral of the matter to a children’s court, where applicable.” 
Section 43(3)312 stipulates the requirements of a preliminary enquiry. Each juvenile should be 
afforded the opportunity of a preliminary enquiry, unless the matter has been diverted by the 
prosecutor, the juvenile is 10 years or younger, or the matter has been withdrawn. A preliminary 
enquiry “must be held within 48 hours of arrest;” and attendance at the preliminary enquiry 
will be regarded as the juveniles’ first appearance before a court of law.   
Section 44(1)313 requires that the juvenile, his representative, such as his parents or guardians, 
and the probation officer, be present at the preliminary enquiry. However, “a preliminary 
enquiry may proceed in the absence of the juvenile, his representative, or probation officer, if 
the sentencer is satisfied that to proceed would be in the best interests of the juvenile.”314 The 
sentencer must record the reason/s for such a decision.315 The sentencer also retains the right 
to request or subpoena any such person/s who has interests, or whose presence is needed at the 
preliminary inquiry.316  
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Section 49317 authorises the sentencer to order the juvenile to be diverted in terms of s 52(5), 
or referring the juvenile to a child justice court in terms of s 47(9)(c); and amending any non-
custodial conditions in terms of s 24(4), consequently warning the juvenile and his 
representative of failure to appear.   
4.8. Trial  
The CJA318 defines a child justice court as “any court provided for in the CPA319, dealing with 
the bail application, plea, trial or sentencing of a child.”320 
A child justice court is tasked in terms of s 63(4)(a)-(b) of the CJA321 to ensure that “the best 
interests of the juvenile are upheld during the proceedings.” The court must thus elicit any 
additional information relevant to the case, and must ensure that during all stages of the trial 
“the proceedings are fair, and not unduly hostile; and are appropriate to the age and 
understanding of the juvenile.”  
Parental or guardian assistance for the juvenile is required during the trial proceedings.322 
Should such people not be present, the probation officer, in exceptional cases, may appoint an 
independent observer to assist the juvenile.323  
Section 66(1) of the CJA expressly states that “a child justice court must conclude all trials of 
juveniles as speedily as possible; and must ensure that postponements are limited in number 
and duration.”324  
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4.9. Sentencing  
The child justice court must, after the conviction of a juvenile, impose a sentence in accordance 
with the CJA.325  
Section 69 of the CJA326 expresses the objectives of sentencing as: 
 “Encouraging accountability;”  
 “Promoting individualised sentencing by application of proportionality principles;” 
 “Promoting reintegration of the child into the family and community;” 
 “Ensuring that rehabilitation conditions specified in the sentence assist in communal 
reintegration;” and 
 “Using imprisonment only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible 
period.”  
The CJA327 encourages the imposition of combined sentences to give effect to the objectives 
of the sentencing outline above.328  
When considering the imposition of a detention sentence at a youth care centre, the sentencer 
must take cognisance of the following:329 
 “Whether the seriousness of the offence indicates a tendency towards harmful 
activities;” 
 “Whether the harm caused justifies a detention sentence;” 
 “Whether the extent of the harm caused may be equated to the culpability of the 
juvenile;” and 
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 “Whether the juvenile is in need of a particular service provided at the detention 
centre.” 
When considering the imposition of an imprisonment sentence, the sentencer must take 
cognisance of the following:330 
 “The seriousness of the offence in respect of the harm caused and the culpability of the 
juvenile;” 
 “The protection of the community;” 
 “The severity of the impact of the offence on the victim;” 
 “Previous failure of the juvenile to respond to non-custodial sentences;” and 
 “Desirability of keeping the juvenile out of prison.”  
A child justice court may dispense with a pre-sentence report in which the juvenile was 
convicted of a Schedule 1 offence.331 However, should the sentencer consider the imposition 
of a detention sentence, he or she must request a pre-sentence report. The sentencer is “not 
obliged to impose the recommended sentence given in the pre-sentence report, but must enter 
his reasons for the imposition of a different sentence,”332 should there be a variation.  
Section 72-79 of the CJA333 prescribes the sentencing options available to the sentencer. It 
includes, but is not limited to: “community-based sentences, restorative justice sentences, fines 
or alternative to fines, correctional supervision, compulsory residence in a child and youth 
care centre, and imprisonment.” These sentencing options have been detailed in Chapter 2 
above. 
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Failure to comply with the imposed sentence justifies a “child justice court to confirm, amend, 
or substitute the sentence.”334  
4.10. Restorative Justice 
The CJA335 defines restorative justice as “an approach to justice that aims to involve the child 
offender, the victim, the families concerned, and community members to collectively identify 
and address harms, needs, and obligations, through accepting responsibility, making 
restitution, taking measures to prevent a recurrence of the incident, and promoting 
reconciliation.”336  
Skelton asserts that diversion is not the only restorative justice measure inherent in the CJA.337 
The CJA338 allows for victim-offender mediation; family-group conferencing, and other 
restorative-justice measures during the trial and sentencing phases.339  Sentencing options such 
as restitution or compensation are restorative in nature.340 Hence it is submitted that the 
legislature has intended the juvenile to benefit from restorative justice, should he not have been 
afforded the opportunity of diversion at the pre-trial phase.341  
A prime practical example of restorative justice at work was in S v Shilubane342 where the 
accused was convicted with the theft of seven fowls.  Apart the accused’s genuine remorse, he 
was sentenced to nine months imprisonment.  On review, the sentence was ‘set aside and 
replaced with a suspended sentence.’  The sentencer reasoned that, in keeping with the new 
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values based on restorative justice, the complainant would have been more satisfied to receive 
restitution for his loss.   
However, restorative justice is not without defect:343 vengeful communities have the ability to 
exert more punitive measures than the formal criminal justice system if the juvenile is allowed 
reintegration into society.344 The killing of 14-year-old Kagiso is a prime example of such 
vigilantism.345 Thus, it is submitted that restorative justice measures which involve community 
involvement, must be managed within the framework of the minimum standards and rights 
afforded to juveniles by the Act and international instruments.346   
4.11. Constitutional Principles Relating to the Rights of Juvenile 
Delinquents 
International instruments endorsed by South Africa contributed to the promulgation of 
children’s rights under the Constitution.347 These instruments all share a common objective 
which requires detention for juvenile delinquents to “be a measure of last resort and for the 
shortest possible period.”  
Children are afforded the protection of all rights within the Bill of Rights in addition to the 
rights contained in s 28. 
The writer’s discussion on the constitutional principles will focus on s 28(1)(g) and s 28(2).    
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4.11.1. S 28(1)(g): Detention as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
possible period 
Section 28 of the Constitution348 brought about change regarding the treatment of juvenile 
delinquents in conflict with the law.  
Section 28(1)(g)349 provides that “every child has the right not to be detained except as a 
measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under s 12350 and 
s 35,351 the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the 
right to be kept separate from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and be treated in a 
manner, and kept in conditions taking account of the child’s age.”352  
The Constitution353 expressly limits detention of juvenile delinquents by way of time and 
severity,354  suggesting that alternative sanctions, preferably restorative justice in nature, should 
be sought and implemented before considering the imposition of a detention sentence.  
However, this does not mean that juvenile delinquents may not be detained.355 All rights within 
the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations clause in terms of s 36 of the Constitution. 
The primary objective of the Constitution356 was to keep juveniles away from the criminal 
justice system; and, should this be impossible, juveniles should not be imprisoned except as a 
“measure of last resort.”357   
                                                 
348 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
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350 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
351 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
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The principle that juvenile detention should be “a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
possible period” is considered vague, owing to its inability to give objective sentencing 
guidelines and because of the principle’s inherent excessively wide judicial discretion.358  
In S v Brandt359 the SCA had to consider whether a ‘sentence of life imprisonment imposed on 
the appellant, who at the time of the commission of the offence was 17 years and 7 months, 
was an appropriate sentence.’360  The appellant was a member of a satanic coven in Port 
Elizabeth.361 On 12 June 2000, he hitch-hiked to his parental home in Hofmeyr, with the 
purpose of killing his parents.362 The satanic sect promised him, that this act would elevate his 
status to high priest within the coven.363 When he arrived at his parental home, however, he 
was not able to go through with the deed.364 He then sought refuge in alcohol and dagga.  
Realising that he required money and transport to return to Port Elizabeth, he decided to rob 
the deceased, a 75 year old female neighbour.365 He killed the deceased with a single fatal blow 
to the head with a knife, and then proceeded to steal a portable radio, car keys and R300.00.366 
The trial court convicted the appellant on charges of murder, robbery with aggravating 
circumstances and attempted robbery. The trial judge therefore imposed the statutory 
prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for the murder because he did not find any 
substantial and compelling circumstances.367 However, the judge did not take into account the 
appellant’s age at the time of the commission of the offence.  The SCA held “that when a 
sentencing court is faced with the task of sentencing a juvenile offender, it should also take 
                                                 
358 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing a child who murders – DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 (1) SACR 243 (SCA)’ (2007) 
20 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 339 
359 2005 (1) SACR 435 (SCA) 
360 Supra at para 1 
361 2005 (1) SACR 435 (SCA) at para 3 
362 Supra  
363 Supra  
364 Supra  
365 Supra  
366 Supra  
367 Supra at para 5 
65 
 
account the provisions of some international instruments, which do not encourage detention of 
juveniles. Youthfulness per se would ordinarily constitute a substantial and compelling 
circumstances.”368 The SCA affirmed that ‘the traditional aims of punishment in respect of 
juvenile offenders have to be re-appraised and developed to accord with the Constitution and 
that they should be aimed at reintegration and rehabilitation.’369 The SCA stated that:  
“the recognition that juveniles accused of committing offences should be treated 
differently to adults is now over a century old.’370  ‘Historically, the South African 
justice system has never had a separate, self-contained and compartmentalised system 
for dealing with juvenile offenders.’371  ‘Our justice system has generally treated 
juvenile offenders as smaller versions of adult offenders.’372 ‘Hence juvenile offenders 
charged with an offence must be dealt with in a manner which takes account of their 
age, circumstances, maturity as well as intellectual and emotional capacity.”373  
The SCA held that should a sentencing court be unable to depart from the statutory prescribed 
minimum sentence unless the juvenile offender established the existence of substantial and 
compelling circumstances, meant the juvenile offender would be burdened in the same way as 
the adult offender.  This would infringe the CJA374 principle that detention should be a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest possible period of time.  
The court did not express what would constitute the ‘shortest possible period,’375 but it did 
express that:  
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“the guiding principles must include the need for proportionality, the best interests of 
the juvenile, and the least possible restrictive deprivation of the juvenile’s liberty, which 
should be a measure of last resort and restricted to the shortest possible period of time; 
this entail a limitation on certain forms of sentencing such as a ban on life imprisonment 
without parole for juvenile offenders.”376  
Upon consultation of the probation officer report, which noted that the appellant had a 
neglected childhood, was ill-disciplined and had ineffective parenting, the appellant was raised 
in an atmosphere of social and emotional deprivation, alcohol and substance abuse was the 
norm, previous conflict with the law was a commonplace which was followed by admission to 
a place of safety and an industrial school, two suicide attempts followed and involvement in a 
satanic group appeared attractive to an impressionable immature mind,377 the SCA ordered 18 
years of imprisonment due to the appellant relative youthfulness which would allow for 
rehabilitation even after a fairly long period of imprisonment.378 
In Director of Public Prosecution, KZN v P 379 the appellant was a 12 year old girl, guilty of 
the murder of her grandmother.380 The appellant approached two men and asked them to help 
her kill her grandmother promising them goods from the house and sexual relations.381 The 
state attacked the sentence of community service as “lenient given the gravity of the offences 
committed by the accused.”382 The SCA argued that “the sentencing of juvenile offenders is 
never easy and is far more complex than the sentencing of adult offenders.”383 The court of 
appeal arrived at its decision by closely following the approach adopted in the Brandt case384 
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and emphasised the reintegration of juvenile offenders into society and the aims of 
rehabilitation. The court concurred with the Brandt case385 that juvenile offenders should not 
be caged, and that detention should be a ‘measure of last resort,’ as well as the need to 
individualise a sentence to ensure that the sentence imposed does not result in the accused 
returning to society with a more distorted personality.  The court held that:  
“imprisonment should only be imposed on juvenile offenders who have been convicted 
of serious violent crimes, but that it is clear that in every case involving a juvenile 
offender, the ambit and scope of sentencing will have to be widened in order to give 
effect to the principle that a juvenile offender is not to be detained expect as a measure 
of last resort and if detention is unavoidable, it should be for the shortest possible 
period of time.”386  
The court replaced the sentence with seven years’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for 5 years 
on condition that she is not convicted of an offence of which violence is an element and 
sentenced to 36 months of correctional supervision with stringent conditions.387 The court 
unfortunately did not express any guidelines for what constitutes the ‘shortest possible 
period.’388 
In S v Kwalase389 the court held that serious crimes require severe punishment to be imposed, 
however, the sentencer should not overemphasise the seriousness of the crime to justify a 
severe sentence at the expense of the juvenile delinquent. The court, however, failed to provide 
an objective guideline on what constitutes such overemphasis.390  
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Terblanche asserts that it is not enough to say that the juvenile must be dealt with in a manner 
which takes account of his age, circumstances, maturity, intellect, and emotional capacity. It is 
submitted that, until leading courts are prepared to clearly state the set percentage or formula a 
juvenile delinquents sentence must be reduced by for the sentences typically imposed for adults 
who commit certain offences, there will be no objective yardstick; and the sentence will remain 
within the subjective opinion of the sentencer. Since the CJA391 prescribes that the 
blameworthiness of a juvenile delinquent should be less than that of an adult who committed a 
similar offence, he maintains that it should be possible to quantify blameworthiness.392  
Academics suggest that, wherever possible, a sentence of imprisonment should be avoided, 
especially in the case of a first-time offender. Imprisonment should be considered a measure 
of last resort, when no other sentence may be considered appropriate. Where imprisonment is 
considered appropriate, it should be the shortest possible period of time, with regard to the 
nature and gravity of the offence, and the needs of society, as well as the particular needs and 
the interests of the juvenile. The general sentencing guidelines on the shortest possible period 
of detention offer that this should be roughly half the adult sentence for the same or similar 
offence committed.393 It is submitted that detention sentences for juveniles should be roughly 
half of that imposed for adults due to juvenile offenders’ limited criminal capacity and 
youthfulness. Hence, this calls for an individualised sentence promoting rehabilitation and 
reintegration into society.  
However,  a brief glance at case law indicates that sentencers have frequently resorted to the 
application of severe sentences, while the presence of youth and absence of aggravating factors 
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have called for less severe sentences. This seems to suggest trial courts’ willingness to imprison 
first-time juvenile offenders and offenders of minor and serious offences, where restorative 
community-based sentences could have been more appropriate.394 Although thorough appeal 
and review procedures inherent in the CJA395 have allowed erroneous sentences to be 
overturned, this indicates the trial court sentencers’ inability to evaluate and apply facts, 
sentencing factors, and appropriate sentences to juvenile delinquents.396 This sentencing 
inability, inconsistency, and inequality has led to inconsistent juvenile sentences that result in 
the violation of constitutionally entrenched children’s rights.  
Although sentencing discretion is essential, and without it, it is impossible to individualise an 
‘appropriate’ sentence for juvenile delinquents, this has led to sentence inconsistency and 
impossibility in determining a basis for sentences.397 It is therefore submitted that consistency 
in sentencing is only possible when sentence discretion is curbed.398 Further research will 
attempt to suggest or develop a juvenile sentencing guideline based on the Dutch bos-polaris 
sentencing guidelines that will intend to curb, but not completely limit judicial discretion, to 
ensure that juvenile delinquents’ rights are upheld while sentence consistency is ensured. 
4.11.2. S 28(2): The best interests of the child 
Section 28(2)399 emphasises that “the best interests of the child is of paramount importance 
apropos of every matter affecting the child, including detention.”  
Hence, the best interests of the juvenile require a proper evaluation of all relevant facts, since 
it forms the basis for the proportionality test.    
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In S v Kwalase400 the court described the application of the principle of proportionality to 
juvenile offenders as follows: 
“The judicial approach towards the sentencing of juvenile offenders must therefore be 
re-appraised and developed in order to promote an individualised response which is 
not only in proportion to the nature and gravity of the offence and the needs of society, 
but which is also appropriate to the needs and interests of the juvenile offender.  If at 
all possible, the sentencing judicial officer must structure the punishment in such a way 
as to promote the reintegration of the juvenile concerned into his or her family and 
community.” 
4.12. Sentences imposed in accordance with the CJA 
In order to determine that the interpretation given to the sentencing principle that imprisonment 
should be ‘a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period’ was adhered to, the 
writer has to investigate the sentences imposed prior to the CJA401 and sentences in accordance 
with the CJA.402 
4.12.1. Cases pre CJA 
Terblanche asserted that it has been duly acknowledged that a different approach is required in 
the sentencing of juvenile offenders.403  In R v Smith404 the court held that “the state should not 
punish a child of tender years as a criminal and stamp him as such throughout his after life, 
but it should endeavour…to educate and uplift him.”  The Court in S v Jansen405 shared the 
same sentiments, arguing that “the interests of society cannot be served by disregarding the 
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interests of young, for a mistaken form of punishment might easily result in a person with a 
distorted or more distorted personality being eventually returned into society.”  
4.12.1.1. S v Nkosi406  
Until recently S v Nkosi407 was the most authoritative case regarding the sentencing of juvenile 
offenders in terms of s 51-53 of the CLAA.408 The court had to consider various issues, namely, 
the analysis of the relevant provisions of the CLAA, the constitutional provisions and also the 
role of international law in the sentencing of juvenile offenders.  Nkosi, the appellant, who was 
16 years old at the time of the commission of the offence, was convicted of murder while acting 
in common purpose.409  As the appellant acted in pursuit of common purpose in committing 
the crime of murder, the offence fell within the ambit of Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CLAA410 
which prescribed certain minimum sentences.  S 51(3)(b) of CLAA411 which was applicable to 
juveniles between the 16 and 18 years of age contained “no reference to substantial and 
compelling circumstances, but required a court which decided to impose a minimum sentence 
to enter the reasons for its decision on the record of proceedings.  The court a quo had made 
no distinction between s 51(3)(a) and s 51(3)(b) and that the court having found no substantial 
and compelling circumstances that did exist, imposed the minimum prescribed sentence, 
namely life imprisonment.  The court of appeal clearly set out the position with regard to 
juvenile offenders in clear terms that there should be no reference to substantial and compelling 
circumstances.412  Furthermore, the appeal court set down the following guidelines when 
dealing with the sentencing of juvenile offenders:413 
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 “Whenever possible a sentence of imprisonment should be avoided, especially in the 
case of first offenders;” 
 “Imprisonment should be considered as a measure of last resort, where no other 
sentence can be considered appropriate;” 
 “Where imprisonment is considered appropriate it should be the shortest possible 
period of time having regard to the nature and gravity of the offence and the needs of 
society as well as the particular needs and interest of the juvenile offender;” 
 “It at all possible, the sentence must structure the punishment in such a manner to 
promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of the juvenile concerned into their family 
and community.”    
The appeal court consequently concluded that “life imprisonment may only be considered in 
exceptional circumstances.”   
4.12.1.2. W.N. v S414  
The appellant was convicted of and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.  
The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant, a 17 year old boy, and the complainant, a 
17 year old girl, “attended the same high school and were friends.”415 On the evening of 5 July 
2004, the complainant received a message from the appellant that he wanted her to come to his 
house to talk. During the visit, “the appellant assaulted the complainant into submission and 
raped her in his room despite her protestations.”416 Overwhelmed by the events, the 
complainant attempted suicide but, fortunately, she suffered no harm.   
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Upon conviction, two pre-sentencing reports were obtained in respect of the appellant.  “Both 
social workers reported that the appellant showed no remorse for his actions.  In the correctional 
officer’s opinion, the appellant seemed to have no insight into the extent of harm he has 
inflicted on the victim and she concluded that the appellant would not benefit from correctional 
supervision.  The probation officer reported that the appellant refused to cooperate with her; 
she recommended that an imprisonment sentence would be appropriate because of the 
seriousness of the crime but that the appellant could be referred to correctional supervision for 
assessment if the court was so minded.  The court a quo, sentenced the appellant to ten years 
imprisonment of which four years were conditionally suspended.”417  
On appeal, it was held that the court a quo “clearly gave due consideration to the findings set 
out in the pre-sentence reports relating to the appellant’s personal circumstances, he 
misconceived the import of the probation officer’s recommendation.  While the probation 
officer obviously had misgivings about the appellant attitude towards the offence, she 
nevertheless did not reject correctional supervision as a sentencing option.”418  The court a quo 
“unquestioning reliance on a negative recommendation in the reports based on the appellant’s 
persistent denial of guilt was another misdirection on his part.”   
The court of appeal noted the following:  
“The fundamental principle in these instruments is that a child offender should not be 
deprived of his or her liberty except as a measure of last resort, for the shortest 
appropriate period  and where detention is unavoidable, it must be individualised with 
the focus on the child’s rehabilitation. In addition to these guiding standards, the 
sentencing court must take into account the child’s best interests in accordance with s 
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28(2) of the Constitution.  Notably, regardless of the requirement of limited use of 
deprivation of liberty, the trite principle of proportionality, which is now required by 
the Constitution itself, namely that the sentence imposed must fit the nature and 
seriousness of the offence of which the accused was found guilty and must be fair to 
both the offender and society, is also applicable to child offenders.”419 
The court of appeal referred to DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P420 which held that in “determining an 
appropriate sentence the court must take cognisance of the fact that the Constitution421 and 
international instruments do envisage imprisonment of juveniles who have been convicted of 
serious violent crime to be detained only for the shortest possible period and be kept separate 
from adult offenders, and does not outright forbid the imprisonment of juvenile offenders.”  
The court of appeal noted that correctional supervision is a community based form of 
punishment.   
“Its value lies mainly in that it is lighter than direct imprisonment and offers an offender 
an opportunity of remaining within the community without the negative influences of 
prison whilst serving substantial punishment.’  ‘Rendering this form of punishment 
extremely useful in the case of juvenile offenders as it emphasizes the rehabilitation of 
the offender and allows for an individualised punishment. However, despite the 
apparent advantages, it has been cautioned by the courts that the imposition of 
correctional supervision should be exercised with care, to maintain its credibility and 
certainly not where the crime is too serious”422  
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In determining an appropriate sentence, the court of appeal held that “it must bear in mind that 
too harsh a punishment serves neither the interests of justice nor those of society.  Neither does 
one that is too lenient. Courts should therefore strive for a proper balance that has due regard 
to all the objects of sentencing.”423  Maya JA concluded that correctional supervision is 
woefully inadequate in this case.  It lacks the appropriate punitive impact demanded by the 
gravity of the offence and does not carry the requisite strong deterrent message to other would 
be rapists in the community.   Maya JA held that the appeal must fail and that six years 
imprisonment was appropriate.  
In a separate judgement Cameron JA, concurred with Maya JA on “her set out of the facts and 
reasoning but differed from her conclusion that the appeal against sentence must fail.”424 
Cameron JA argued that the Constitution425 requires sentencers to “take cognisance of the fact 
that the appellant was only 17 years old. Prison must therefore be a ‘last resort.’ This bears 
not only on whether an imprisonment is a sentencing option, but on the sort of imprisonment 
sentence must be imposed. So if there is a legitimate option other than prison, sentencers must 
choose it; but if imprisonment is unavoidable its form and duration should also be tempered.  
Everyday a juvenile spends in prison should be because there is no alternative.”426   
Cameron JA concluded that “imprisonment cannot be avoided and correctional supervision is 
not a suitable alternative sentence because every rape sentence sends a public message.”427  
“This option would be a soft message as well as enable the courts’ seriousness in seeking to 
punish and deter rapes to be called into question.”428  However Maya JA “six year sentence 
disregards the youthfulness of the appellant, and it may set him up for ruin, while foreclosing 
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the possibility, embodied in his youth, that he will still benefit from rehabilitation and 
reintegration.”429  Arguing if sentencers “are to risk erring at all, the Constitution430 requires 
them to err by recognising the possibility of promise that may still flower from his youth, rather 
than fixing on the destruction that was immanent in his crime.”431  In his view the “appeal must 
succeed, the sentence set aside and be substituted with 5 years’ imprisonment.”432   
4.12.1.3. S v MGK433 
The accused, “a 16 year old was charged with two counts of robbery and convicted of only one 
count and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment wholly suspended on certain 
conditions.”434   
The facts of the case are as follow: “The accused, together with four other people who could 
not be arrested, robbed the complainant.  The complainant did not retrieve his articles and 
was struck with a stone by the accused.”  
On review, Mocumie J argued that the sentenced imposed by the court a quo was too harsh on 
the accused.  The court was of the impression that the court a quo had been “overwhelmed with 
this type of offence committed by youngsters in Botshabelo and is almost at the end of his wits 
on how to deal with them except through the option he believes will solve the problem; direct 
imprisonment imposed consistently.”435   
The court referred to the juvenile sentencing guidelines for serious and less serious offences 
laid down in S v Nkosi436 and to S v Phulwane & Others437 which held that:  
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“When a youth or juvenile strays from the path of rectitude to criminal conduct, it is 
the responsibility of judicial officer invested with the task of sentencing such a youth to 
ensure that she or he receives all relevant information pertaining to such a juvenile to 
enable him or her to structure a sentence that will best suit the needs and interests of 
the particular youth.  It is, after all, a salutary principle of sentencing that sentence 
must be individualised.  I venture to suggest that every judicial officer who has to 
sentence a youthful offender must ensure that whatsoever sentence he or she decides to 
impose will promote rehabilitation of that particular youth and have, as its priority, the 
reintegration of the youthful offender back into his or her family and, of course the 
community.” 
The court concluded that the court a quo starting point in the determining of a sentence was 
that the only appropriate sentence would be direct imprisonment, due to the considerable 
weight he placed on the “interests of society and total disregard of the socio-economic factors 
suggested to by the probation officer in the presentence report, the youthfulness of the accused 
and the fact that the accused was a first time offender.”438  “Correctional supervision is one 
of the options for an alternative sentence provided for in the CPA.439  It is a severe sentence 
that has rehabilitation and retribution compacted into one.  It gives results required if the aim 
of the sentencer is amongst others to ensure that this young offender is brought in line with the 
correct way of living where he can serve punishment amidst the society he has wronged.  It can 
even be imposed in the most serious of offences including murder.”440 
In light of the above, the “conviction was confirmed and a sentence of 18 months imprisonment 
wholly suspended for 3 years on certain conditions imposed by the magistrate is set aside and 
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substituted with a R 1200.00 fine or 8 months imprisonment which is wholly suspended for 3 
years on condition that the accused is not convicted of robbery, theft, assault or attempt thereto 
committed during the period of suspension.” 441 
4.12.1.4. S v Brandt442 
See Chapter 4.11.1 for case analysis. 
4.12.1.5. Director of Public Prosecutions, KZN v P443 
See Chapter 4.11.1 for case analysis. 
4.12.2. Cases post CJA  
4.12.2.1. EJB v S444 
The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years’ 
imprisonment. 
The facts of the case are as follows: “The appellant, Accused 1 (17 years old), Accused 2 (15 
years old) and Accused 3 (19 years old), came across the deceased who was under the influence 
of alcohol.  Accused 2 suggested in racist terms that that the deceased should be assaulted. 
They all assaulted the deceased by kicking and punching him. The deceased was left lying on 
the pavement where he later succumbed to his injuries. The trial court found on the facts that 
the appellant and two accused had acted in common purpose, finding them guilty of murder on 
the basis of dolus eventualis and sentenced each of them to 15 years imprisonment.”445   
“In sentencing the accused, the court of appeal was mindful to the Constitutional provisions 
applicable to children.  The court also took into account the fact that the accused consumed 
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alcohol, drugs and dagga prior to the commission of the offence.  In addition the court requested 
a probation officer’s report and a correctional supervision report.  Both these reports suggested 
a sentence in terms of s 276 of the CPA.”446  
On appeal, the sentence was upheld, reasoning that the offence was not only very serious in 
nature, but was racially motivated in the killing of an innocent person. Judges Mavundla, Van 
der Byl and Manumela stating: 
“The gravity of the offence committed by the appellant and his co-accused in crime does 
not lie only in the killing of an innocent person, and the severity and brutality of the 
commission thereof but more in the motive which propelled them to commit it – racism! 
Racially motivated offences committed by whoever offends against the ethos and 
aspirations of the peoples of this nascent democracy. […] In conclusion, I find that the 
sentence imposed is not shockingly inappropriate and serves the desert of the appellant 
[…]”447 
Hence, this is a grave violation of the fundamental values underlying our democracy.  Thus the 
court of appeal found the accused’ sentence not to have been shockingly inappropriate; and 
deserving of an imprisonment sentence.   
It is submitted that the court of appeal took cognisance of the appellants’ intoxication as 
mitigating factor, however balanced against the racial motivation and brutality of the crime, 
the court opted for detention.  
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4.12.2.2. JL v S448 
The appellant (16 years) was convicted of murder and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment of 
which four years were conditionally suspended for five years.449   
The facts of the case are as follows:  “The appellant fatally stabbed the deceased, a fifteen-
year-old, by inflicting a single stab wound to his chest. In sentencing the appellant to an 
effective 6 years imprisonment, the Magistrate took the following factors into account: the 
seriousness of the offence; the trend of ever younger offenders being convicted of offences of 
this nature; the fact that a 15 year old victim was deprived of a life that lay ahead of him; the 
fact that the incident had a severe impact on his family – the victim’s girlfriend was pregnant 
at that time and the court took cognisance of the fact that a child will have to be raised without 
a father; the fact that the community was tired of violence; that the offence itself was callous 
and that the appellant showed no remorse.”450  
The “appellant’s legal representative requested a further postponement of proceedings in 
order to obtain a correctional supervision report, which was denied by the Magistrate.  The 
appellant submitted that the Magistrate should have established what rehabilitation programs 
were available under correctional supervision as an alternative to direct imprisonment.”451  
The appeal court held that the trial court had misdirected itself by taking the probation officer’s 
report at face value The trial court had failed to take cognisance of the probation officer’s 
recommendations stating concern about the placement of the appellant in a child and youth 
centre; the appellant had previously successfully completed a term of rehabilitation after having 
been arrested for possession of tik, and the appellant’s father was a positive role-model.   
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The appeal court readmitted the matter to the trial court, calling for a correctional supervision 
report, and for considering the sentencing afresh.452   
4.12.2.3. Lukas & Plaatjies v S453 
The appellants were convicted of housebreaking with the intent to steal and with theft and were 
sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment. 
The facts of the case are as follows: The first appellant (15 years of age) and the second 
appellant (16 years of age) broke into the complainant’s house and stole items worth R 5600. 
Both the appellants pleaded guilty. 
The appeal court took cognisance of the probation officer’s reports. The first appellant resides 
with his mother and her partner.  He is the second eldest of five children and the family survives 
on the income of the mother, who earns approximately R250.00 per month.  The probation 
officer reported that the first appellant had 6 previous convictions, of which three are relevant, 
being housebreaking with the intent to steal and theft; however, he did not pose a threat to 
society. The second appellant is the eldest of two children and resides with his mother.  It 
appears that his negative behaviour stems from the poor conditions at home and the absence of 
a father figure. The probation officer reported that the second appellant does not have a good 
relationship with his mother, the appellant has a scholastic achievement of Grade 7, the 
appellant is dependent on his mother for his basic needs and the only source of income is 
R240.00 per month, the appellant had committed the crime while he was under the influence 
of unlawful substances; and he had two previous convictions. The probation officer maintained 
that he was capable of rehabilitation within the community, provided that a suspended sentence 
was considered.   
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The appeal court held despite the social ills that may prevail in the community where the 
appellants resides, society demands that the courts impose appropriate sentences where crimes 
of this nature are committed, taking into account the well-established principles of sentencing, 
noting that it is trite law that direct imprisonment for juvenile offenders should be the last resort. 
Furthermore, the appeal court held that the trial court overemphasised the seriousness of the 
offence and the interests of society at the expense of the appellant’s age and personal 
circumstances; and suggested that a sentence of correctional supervision would have been a 
more appropriate sentence in the circumstances of this case.   
The appeal court referred to S v Kwalase454 which held that the court must properly consider 
the personal circumstances of the offender in the determination of sentence and that the ideal 
is that no child should ever have to go to prison; however there will always be cases so serious 
that imprisonment is the only appropriate punishment, even for juvenile offenders. The 
approach to the treatment of juvenile offenders is to “emphasise the wellbeing of the juvenile 
and to ensure that any reaction to juvenile offenders will be in proportion to the circumstances 
of both the offenders and the offence.”455  
The appeal court took cognisance of the following aggravating factors: the value of the items 
stolen amounted to R5600.00, the complainants privacy was invaded, the prevalence of such 
offences occurs on a regular basis, the appellants’ previous convictions. The seriousness of the 
offence merit severe punishment and that the community expects offenders to be punished, but 
the community also expects at the same time that mitigating circumstances will be taken into 
account and that an offender’s particular position will be given thorough consideration.  In light 
of the above aggravating and mitigating factors, the appeal court took cognisance that the first 
appellant has served almost 10 months imprisonment to date, taking into account all the 
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relevant factors pertaining to sentence, the court of appeal set aside and replaced the sentence 
with 18 months imprisonment, of which 8 months would be conditionally suspended for a 
period of three years.  
4.12.2.4. S v IO456 
The appellant (his specific age was never mentioned in the judgement) had been convicted on 
two counts of murder, three counts of attempted murder, and the unlawful possession of 
firearms and ammunition; and was consequently sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. 
The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant, a juvenile who was under the age of 18 
years at the time of the commission of the offence, appealed against the trial court sentence, 
arguing that the trial court had failed to take cognisance of his s 28 rights457 and the sentencing 
objectives of international instruments. The appellant’s co-accused, an adult, successfully 
appealed against his 35-year sentence, which was reduced to 25 years imprisonment.   
On appeal, the court held that juvenile rights guaranteed in s 28 of the Constitution458 are not 
absolute; all rights in the Bill of Rights being subject to the limitations clause in s 36. The 
“seriousness of the offence, the protection of the community, and the severity of the impact of 
the offence on the victim may thus justify a limitation.” The court acknowledged that the CJA459 
and international instruments require the appellant to be treated more leniently, due to his 
youthfulness, his susceptibility to yield to peer pressure, and more suitable for rehabilitation 
than his adult co-accused, who received a 25-year imprisonment sentence. Hence the court 
upheld the appeal and replaced the sentence with 18 years’ imprisonment. 
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4.12.2.5. BF v S460 
The appellant and his co-accused were convicted on charges of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances, and two counts of rape; and were consequently sentenced to 25 and 35 years, 
respectively.   
The facts of the case are as follows: “The appellant and his co-accused broke into the victim’s 
house, intending to steal money. However, upon realising that the complainant had no money 
in his possession, the two accused demanded the victim’s bank card and access pin, proceeding 
to an ATM to make a withdrawal. Upon returning to the victim’s house, the appellant and his 
co-accused raped two of the complainant’s daughters, and removed goods with an estimated 
value of R6220 from the complainant’s home. The entire episode lasted six to seven hours.”461  
The court a quo sentenced the appellant to ‘15 years’ imprisonment on the robbery charges and 
10 years’ imprisonment on the rape charges, effectively having to serve a period of 25 years 
imprisonment.’462  
On appeal, the issue before the SCA was whether the trial court had misdirected itself in 
imposing a lengthy detention sentence on the appellant, who was 14 years and 10 months old 
at the time of the commission of the offence; a direct violation of s 51(6) of the CLAA.463 
The SCA noted the difficulty courts face when sentencing juveniles, stating:  
“It becomes more onerous where a child is the offender and the offence a very serious 
one.  In the present case the robbery involves the use of a firearm and the knife whilst 
the rape of a child under the age of 16 years.  A decision regarding an appropriate 
sentence becomes even more difficult – when a juvenile has to be sentenced for having 
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committed a very serious crime like this.  Whilst the gravity of the offence calls loudly 
for a severe sentence with strong deterrent and retributive elements, the youthfulness 
of the appellant requires a balanced approach reflecting an equally strong 
rehabilitative component.  After all, the appellant was an immature youth merely 14 
years old.  Although youthfulness remains a strong mitigating factor, one cannot ignore 
the sad reality that, nowadays it is the youth that is engaged in violent and serious 
crimes.”464 
The SCA concluded that the “trial court had overemphasised the seriousness of the offence at 
the expense of the appellant’s youth.  The appeal was upheld and the trial court sentences set 
aside and replaced with a 10-year sentence on robbery charges and a 12-year sentence on the 
rape charges. The SCA ordered the sentences to run concurrently; they were to be antedated 
to 13 December 2000. The appellant will consequently serve 12 years’ imprisonment.”465   
4.12.2.6. Rampeta & Three Others v S466 
The four accused were convicted of a rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The facts of the case are as follows: Appellant 1 (20 years of age), appellant 2 (18 years of 
age), appellant 3 (16 years of age), and appellant 4 (18 years of age) abducted and raped a 15-
year-old girl. The first appellant dragged the victim to the third appellant house, while the 
second, third and fourth appellant followed. The first appellant ordered the victim to hand over 
her cell phone and proceeded to threaten her with gun to get undressed and have intercourse 
with her in the presence of the other appellants.  While the first appellant raped the victim, the 
other three appellants made sexual remarks and laughed. Each of the other three appellants 
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proceeded to rape the victim in turn. The appellants took the victim to a tavern nearby and 
threaten to kill her with knives and a firearm if she reported the rape to the authorities.467  
The trial court, in considering a sentence, took cognisance of the following: a gang rape of a 
victim below the age of 16 years; that three of the appellants were first-time offenders; none of 
the appellants grew up in a normal, formal family home (appellant 1, appellant 3 and appellant 
4 were raised by their grandmothers and appellant 2 was raised by his sister); the victim did 
not sustain any serious physical injuries.  Furthermore, the appeal court held that the sentence 
must be proportionate to the role of each of the appellants who participated in the commission 
of the crime as it was clear from the evidence that the first appellant played a leading role in 
the commission of the crime.  
The appeal court held that: 
“While the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime and the need 
for effective sanctions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to be 
ignored. All factors traditionally taken into account in sentencing (whether or not they 
diminish moral guilt) thus continue to play a role; none is excluded at the outset from 
consideration in the sentencing process. The ultimate impact of all the circumstances 
relevant to sentencing must be measured against the composite yardstick ('substantial and 
compelling') and must be such as cumulatively justify a departure from the standardised 
response that the Legislature has ordained.” 
The appeal court however noted that one must keep in mind that “life imprisonment is the 
heaviest sentence a person can be legally obliged to serve.” 
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The appeal court argued that the rape was of serious nature, especially since it was a gang rape 
where each member took their turn to rape the victim. The victim physical injuries were few 
and of a superficial nature; however she sustained serious emotional and psychological trauma 
which will take years to be recover from. All four of the appellants are juveniles, and except 
for the first appellant who has a previous conviction, this was a first conviction for the other 
three appellants.  
In light of the above, the appeal court set aside and reduced the sentences as follows: “Appellant 
1 was sentenced to 23 years’ imprisonment; appellants 2 and 4 were sentenced to 18 years’ 
imprisonment; and appellant 3 was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.”468   
4.12.2.7. TJT  S469 
The appellant and his co-accused were convicted of two counts of rape and one count of 
theft. 
The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant and his co-accused broke into the 
complainants’ house, at approximately midnight, armed with a knife. Both accused raped 
each of the complainants in the presence of a 13-year-old boy. The appellant proceeded to 
remove items from the complainants’ house.470   
The “appellant, who was 15 years at the time of the commission of the offence,’ and his co-
accused, were sentenced to ‘9 years’ imprisonment on each count of rape, and 2 years’ 
imprisonment for theft.”  “The court ordered that the sentences should run consecutively, 
effectively sentencing the appellant to 20 years’ imprisonment.” 471 
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On appeal, it was found that the trial court was correct in convicting the appellant for serious 
offences. However, it failed to take account of the appellant’s personal circumstances; and 
that the law requires juveniles to be treated differently during sentencing.472 “The personal 
circumstances were highlighted in the probation officer’s report which was handed in as an 
exhibit. These included the fact that the appellant was raised by a single parent, his father left 
his mother whilst he was still a toddler and subsequently he does not know him; he did not 
have any previous convictions; there was a high risk of juvenile delinquency in the area he 
lived and all his family members were unemployed.”473  
The appeal court “set aside the sentence imposed by the trial court, ordered that the two 
years’ imprisonment imposed in respect of count 4 and three years of the nine year 
imprisonment sentence in respect of count 3, should run concurrently with the nine year 
sentence in respect of count 2, effectively imposing a 15 year imprisonment sentence on the 
appellant.” 474   
4.12.2.8. BOM & AL v S475 
The appellants had raped and stabbed a 13-year-old girl to death. Appellant 1 was convicted of 
murder, but acquitted on the rape charge.  Appellant 2 was convicted on both counts.  Since 
both appellants were 18 years of age, the sentencing was conducted in accordance with s 51(1) 
of CLAA.476 The trial court did not find any “substantial or compelling circumstances,” which 
justified the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence. 477  
On appeal, it was found that the trial court had “failed to take proper cognisance of the 
cumulative effect of the appellants’ youth, the appellants’ intoxication, and the pre-sentencing 
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reports submitted by the probation officer, particularly the socio-economic circumstances of 
the appellants.” 478In respect of appellant 1, these included: “that his parents died, where after 
he was cared for by siblings.  After the death of his parents he started to display inappropriate 
behaviour, such as absconding from school.  He dropped out of school about a year thereafter 
and started using dagga by the age of 16. He had two previous convictions of assault GBH and 
malicious injury to property on which he was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment which was 
wholly suspended.”479 With regard to appellant 2, the pre-sentence report indicated “that he 
was raised by his grandmother.  He left school during Grade 10 on his own violation.  He then 
started smoking dagga and drank alcohol.  He presented a lot of anger when confronted with 
had he had done.  He also had two previous convictions – crimes which he had committed with 
appellant 1.”480 
The appeal court held the trial court did not take the cumulative effect of the appellants’ youth, 
their socio-economic backgrounds, the role played by liquor in the offence, into account. The 
court held that “life imprisonment is the heaviest sentence a person can legally be obliged to 
serve. It should therefore not be imposed lightly, without full and proper consideration of all 
relevant facts.”481 
The appeal was upheld and the trial court sentences set aside and replaced with 20 years’ 
imprisonment. Appellant 2’s sentences were ordered to run concurrently.482 
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4.12.2.9. S v FM (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)483 
The accused (16 years of age) was convicted for the contravention of s 3 of the CLAA,484 
corresponding to the common law crime of rape; and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, of 
which 5 years were suspended for 5 years.485   
The facts of the case are as follows: The accused was charged for the rape of an eleven-year-
old mentally disabled girl.  The accused pleaded guilty.  
On appeal, the high court held that s 85(1) of the CJA 486allows for automatic review in respect 
of all juveniles convicted in terms of the CJA487 who are sentenced to any form of imprisonment 
not wholly suspended, or any sentence of compulsory residence in a child and youth centre.   
In considering the sentence, the appeal court stated that:  
‘No 16 year old boy, particularly one who participated in the adult world to the degree 
to which the accused did, could honestly believe that he had a relationship with this 
mentally disabled 11 year old girl.  What the accused meant when he made this claim 
was that when the mood took him, he used the victim as a receptacle for gratification 
of his sexual urges and when he did so, the victim did not object.  In light of the history 
I have described above, the accused was at the time he was sentenced a menace to 
society. A custodial sentence was essential to protect society against a person who did 
not recognise the boundaries that the Bill of Rights impose in respect of every person’s 
dealings with every other member of society.’488 
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However, the appeal court held that the “accused should not be punished for his choices as an 
adult would since the accused choices were juvenile choices and the primary purpose of the 
sentence imposed on the accused must be not to punish him for those choices but to facilitate 
every effort to bring him to understand that the choices and the world in which he lives does 
not offer other choices and a way of life other than that in which he grew up.”489 
The appeal court set aside, antedated and reduced the sentence to 10 years’ imprisonment, of 
which 5 years were wholly suspended for a period of 5 years.490 
4.12.2.10. KM v S491 
The appellant (his age was never mentioned in the judgement) was convicted of three counts 
of rape and one count of sexual assault; and consequently sentenced to life imprisonment on 
each of the rape charges, and five years’ imprisonment on the sexual assault charge.  
The facts of the case are as follows: The appellant raped and sexually assaulted the victims 
who were residents of a place of safety (Mary Moodley) for juvenile boys who had been 
previously sexually abused by their family members.   
The appeal court held that the three life sentences imposed on the appellant were shockingly 
excessive for a juvenile. The appeal court set aside and reduced the sentence to 18 years’ 
imprisonment on all four counts, of which six years were suspended for five years.  
4.12.2.11. S v MK492 
The “accused pleaded guilty to two counts of rape of minors and was sentenced to 5 years’ 
imprisonment, antedated to the date of arrest.”493 
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During the trial, “a pre-sentencing reported was submitted, recommending that the accused be 
diverted in terms of s 53(4)(c) and (d) of the CJA.”494 “The social worker indicated that the 
accused comes from an unsophisticated, poor, albeit stable, family background.  Juvenile 
delinquency stepped in at a very young age and the accused would disappear from home for 
long periods of time where he would live on the streets.  He soon engaged in substance abuse.  
This impacted negatively on his scholastic performance and he prematurely abandoned school.  
The accused himself was a victim of sexual assault, having been raped on several occasions, 
and for this reason professed ignorance that rape was a crime.  A psychiatric report emanating 
from Sterkfontein Hospital where the accused was assessed pursuant to an order of the court 
in terms of section 79 of the CPA,495 indicated diagnosis of moderate mental retardation, 
reactive attachment disorder and substance abuse.”496  The sentencer, however, held that 
diversion is only available prior to conviction and that the seriousness of the offences justified 
imprisonment as opposed to the recommended sentence of correctional supervision. 
On appeal, having considered the pre-sentencing report, the court found that the accused was 
in dire need of rehabilitation and reintegration, which would best be achieved outside the prison 
environment.   
The appeal court held that the recommendation of the social worker was in the best interests of 
the accused and should be implemented, namely that:497 
 “The accused be detained at the Sterkfontein Hospital for intensive therapy and 
treatment;” 
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 “He thereafter be referred to and be ordered to attend sexual offenders’ programmes; 
and, finally” 
 “He be placed under correctional supervision.” 
 The matter was remitted to the trial court to impose sentencing afresh.   
4.12.2.12. Mpofu v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Two 
Others (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)498 
The applicant lodged an application to the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal against a 
life imprisonment sentence imposed when he was still a juvenile.499 
The facts of the case are as follows:  The applicant and his co-accused were convicted of murder 
and other serious offences committed in 1998, and consequently sentenced in 2001 to life 
imprisonment and 28 years, to run concurrently. By the time his application for appeal was 
heard, he had already served 13 years’ imprisonment.500 
“Applications by the applicant for leave to appeal against his sentence to the High Court and 
the SCA were dismissed on 16 November 2004 and 17 August 2006 respectively.   In 2008, he 
approached the CC for the first time with an application for leave to appeal; the basis that the 
presiding judge was not impartial and violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.  He further 
argued that the fact that the record of his trial could not be traced, infringed his right of access 
to information.  The application for condonation and the application for leave to appeal were 
dismissed – CCT66/08. In 2009, the applicant approached the court again on the basis that his 
right to access to information, his right of appeal and his right to a fair trial were infringed.  
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This application was also dismissed – CCT101/09. In both cases, the CC stated in short reasons 
that it was ‘not in the interests of justice’ to hear the matter.”501 
The majority judgement refused appeal, and held that, while it was a constitutional issue, the 
interests of justice did not favour the granting of leave to appeal. It was held that the applicant 
had failed to establish his right under s 28 of the Constitution; and he failed to show that he 
was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offence.  The fact that the 
application for leave of appeal was only made ten years after the High Court sentenced him, 
and that he failed to explain the extent of this delay, further weakened the interests of justice 
in granting both applications for condonation and for leave.  In additions, the appellant did not 
adequately explain why he brought two previous applications to the CC against his sentence in 
which this issue was never raised. 
In a separate judgement by Van der Westhuizen J, it was held that the leave to appeal should 
be granted; and that, based on the wording of the trial court judgement, the applicant was a 
child at the time of the commission of the offences.   
The minority judgement held that the trial court had misdirected itself in failing to consider the 
applicant’s rights as a child when it imposed its sentence. Hence, the sentence should be set 
aside, and be replaced with 20 years’ imprisonment.    
4.12.2.13. S v Mankayi502 
The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
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The facts of the case are as follows: The accused (17 years old) was drinking with a group of 
persons at a tavern. There was an altercation between members of this group. Later, the accused 
fatally stabbed the deceased (a 19 year old man) outside the tavern.   
The review court held that the trial court had misdirected itself regarding the admittance of 
previous convictions disclosed in the probation officer’s report.  The review court held that the 
admittance of such evidence would be adverse to the interests of the accused, as previous 
convictions were found to be hearsay evidence.  
In determining the appropriate sentence, the review court held that cognisance must be taken 
of the provisions of the CJA;503 and the accused must be treated as a juvenile offender. This 
requires that imprisonment should be considered only as a last resort.  The offence for which 
the accused was convicted is undoubtedly a very serious offence and one that is, too prevalent.  
The combination of alcohol and knives regularly spells death in communities across the country 
and the courts are tasked to deal with the tragic consequences.  The case warranted lengthy 
imprisonment owing to the serious nature of the offence; and the interests of society demanded 
that the accused be appropriately punished. 
The review court held that:  
“In my view when proper consideration is taken of the fact that the accused is a first 
offender and when regard is had to his status as a juvenile it would be appropriate to 
order that a portion of the sentence imposed is conditionally suspended.  That would 
not only meet the requirement that such period of imprisonment as is imposed upon the 
juvenile offender is kept to the minimum that the circumstances of the case demand, it 
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would also serve as a longer term inducement acting upon the accused to refrain from 
any criminal conduct in the future.”504  
The review court set aside and replaced the sentence with 10 years’ imprisonment, two years 
conditionally suspended for a period of four years.   
4.12.2.14. S v CT505 
The accused (15 years of age) was convicted of murder and sentenced to 5 years’ compulsory 
residence at a childcare centre.506 
The facts of the case are as follows: “In the presence of other children, the accused and his 
friends were swimming at a gravel dam. The accused pulled S into the water, pushing his head 
under water.  Two child bystanders rescued S. The accused then pulled the deceased, who 
could not swim, into the water and submerged his head under the water 5 times.  After the fifth 
time, the deceased did not resurface, evidently drowning. The accused proceeded to warn the 
bystanders not to divulge to anyone any information regarding the deceased’s drowning.” 507  
The trial court found the accused guilty of murder on the basis of dolus eventualis; reasoning 
that, since S had to be rescued, the accused must have had an appreciation of the risk of death. 
He nevertheless reconciled himself to the consequences, and repeated the same fatal conduct 
on the deceased. 
On appeal, the sentence was confirmed. The appeal court held that: “the trial court failure to 
enter reasons for the deviation from the recommended sentence by the probation officer did 
not vitiate the sentence; since s 71(4) of the CJA508 states that a presiding officer who imposes 
                                                 
504 Unreported cases 243/2013, Eastern Cape High Court at para 14 
505Unreported case A506/2013, North Gauteng High Court on 9 July 2012 
506 Supra at para 1 
507 Unreported case A506/2013, North Gauteng High Court on 9 July 2012 at para 3 
508 Act 75 of 2008 
97 
 
a sentence other than the one recommended by the probation officer, must enter the reasons 
for the imposition of a different sentence on record.  In this instance, the probation officer 
recommended an imprisonment sentence.  The appeal court found that, because the magistrate 
imposed a more lenient sentence than the one recommended by the probation officer, the 
accused was not prejudiced.  The case was readmitted to the trial court to determine whether 
the accused’s behavioural problems would place the other juveniles at the childcare centre at 
risk or in danger.”509  
4.12.2.15. S v TLT510 
The accused, 15 years and 10 months at the time of the commission of the offence, was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to compulsory residence at a childcare centre until 19 years 
of age.  
The facts of the case are as follows: “A fight erupted after a cap was taken from a friend of the 
accused. The accused intervened, and when he was assaulted, he retaliated by stabbing the 
deceased 5 times, killing him. The accused pleaded guilty to the count of murder.”511  
During sentencing, two conflicting reports were submitted.512 The social worker reported 
positively regarding the accused’s behaviour, and recommended compulsory attendance at a 
childcare centre as sentence; while the probation officer recommended direct imprisonment. 
The probation officer based his decision on the following facts: “the accused displayed 
constant misconduct and lack of discipline from a young age; this led him to be expelled from 
school in 2011; the accused abused substances such as dagga and glue; and the impact of the 
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crime on the deceased’s family.”513 The accused was consequently sentenced to compulsory 
residence at a childcare centre until 19 years of age.514 
On review, the trial sentencer acknowledged that he had failed to take cognisance of the 
accused’s behavioural problems; the deceased had been stabbed several times; the accused was 
armed with a knife; the incident caused a severe impact on the deceased’s family; and there 
was an increased prevalence of this type of crime.515 
The review court held that the appeal against sentence must succeed, replacing the sentence 
with compulsory residence at a childcare centre, after which time the accused must be 
imprisoned for a period of time.516 
4.12.2.16. Mahlangu v S517 
The accused was convicted of rape and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment and declared unfit 
to possess a firearm in terms of s 103 of Act 60 of 2000. 
The facts of the case are as follows: The accused (17 years of age) raped a five-year-old girl.  
A pre-sentencing report was obtained which demonstrated that the complainant had suffered 
severe emotional and social trauma as a result of the rape incident such as: phobia of being 
alone; low self-esteem; decline in school performance; oversensitivity; withdrawal and fear of 
men. The complainant struggles to sleep at night and to venture outside the house when it is 
dark.  She has become very shy and quiet. She has also indicated that she is ashamed of what 
happened to her and is also ashamed that the other children in the neighbourhood are aware of 
the incident.  
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A report was obtained from a probation officer, who emphasised that the appellant did not 
acknowledge the charges against him.  What weighed with the probation officer was that the 
complainant trusted the appellant as that he was her uncle.  However, the probation officer 
noted that due regard must be given to the age of the appellant and ruled out a fine or suspended 
sentence even though he was a first time offender based on the seriousness of the crime.  Direct 
imprisonment was recommended as, according to the probation officer, this option would 
prevent the appellant “from committing further crime.”518 
The appeal court held that the magistrate failed to take into consideration the Constitutional 
prescript set out in section 28(2) of the Constitution519 that “(a) child’s best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” 
The appeal court noted that the appellant was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment in terms of 
s 51(2) of the CLAA,520 which prescribes a minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment.  The 
court held that it may be assumed that  the minimum sentencing legislation does not apply to 
16 and 17 year old juveniles, given the provisions of s 28 (1) (g) of the Constitution,521 which 
provides that a child may only be detained as a measure of last resort and  for the shortest 
possible period.     
The appeal court held that, given the seriousness of the offence and the very young age of the 
complainant (5 years old), direct imprisonment was warranted, referring to S v Nkosi522 
“The following principles are applicable in guiding a court's discretion in deciding on 
the suitability of an appropriate form of punishment for a child offender: (i) Wherever 
possible a sentence of imprisonment should be avoided, especially in the case of a first 
                                                 
518 Unreported case A382/2014, Gauteng High Court at para 22 
519 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
520 Act 105 of 1997 
521 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
522 2002 (1) SA 494 (WLD) 
100 
 
offender. (ii) Imprisonment should be considered as a measure of last resort, where no 
other sentence can be considered appropriate.  Serious violent crimes would fall into 
this category. (iii) Where imprisonment is considered appropriate it should be for the 
shortest possible period of time, having regard to the nature and gravity of the offence 
and the needs of society as well as the particular needs and interests of the child 
offender. (iv) If at all possible the judicial officer must structure the punishment in such 
a way as to promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child concerned into her 
or his family or community. (v) The sentence of life imprisonment may only be 
considered in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances would be present where 
the offender is a danger to society and there is no reasonable prospect of his or her 
rehabilitation.”  
The appeal court also referred to S v Phulwane and Another523 which held: 
“I venture to suggest that every judicial officer who has to sentence a youthful offender 
must ensure that whatsoever he or she decides to impose will promote the rehabilitation 
of that particular young and have, as its priority, the reintegration of the youthful 
offender back into his or her family and, of course, the community.” 
In light of the above reasoning, the court set aside and replaced the sentence with 10 years’ 
imprisonment, antedated to 2 May 2013.  
4.12.3. Findings 
4.12.3.1. Cases pre CJA 
Upon investigation of the sentences imposed, the writer concludes the following:  
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From an analysis of the reported cases, it is submitted that three out of the five cases probation 
officers conducted a pre-sentencing report. While four in the five cases the sentencers 
attempted to establish sentencing guidelines for juvenile offenders. It is submitted that this 
indicated a consciousness on behalf of the South African justice system that juvenile offenders 
require different treatment than adult offenders. 
In all five of the reported cases did the sentencers impose an imprisonment sentence. One of 
the cases involved a suspended imprisonment sentence as an alternative to the payment of a 
fine, while another case involved a suspended imprisonment sentence together with 
correctional supervision with stringent conditions.    
4.12.3.2. Cases post CJA 
Upon investigation of the sentences imposed, the writer concludes the following: 
S 71(1)(a)  of the CJA524 expressly requires “a child justice court imposing a sentence to 
request a pre-sentence report prepared by a probation officer to the imposition of sentence.” 
From the analysis on the reported cases it is submitted that eleven out of the sixteen cases pre-
sentencing reports were obtained from a probation officer or social worker. In accordance to s 
71(1)(b) of the CJA,525 a child justice court may only “dispense with a pre-sentence report if 
the juvenile offender was convicted of an offence in Schedule 1 or where requiring the report 
would cause undue delay in the conclusion of the case.” It is submitted that the remaining five 
of the sixteen reported cases were a direct violation of s 71(1)(b) as no reasons were put forward 
that the request for a presentence report would cause undue delay in the conclusion of the 
cases.526 However, in two of the eleven cases where pre-sentencing reports were obtained, the 
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trial court failed to take proper cognisance of the reports or attach due weight to the findings 
contained therein. S 71(4) of the CJA527 expressly states that “a child justice court may impose 
a sentence other than recommended in the pre-sentence report and must, enter the reasons for 
the imposition of a different sentence on the record of the proceedings.” It is submitted that the 
trial court inability to take proper cognisance of the reports or attach due weight to the findings 
contained therein lead to the imposition of excessively harsh sentences which is a violation of 
s 69(1)(a)-(c) and s 69(1)(e) of the CJA. 528   
Mitigating and aggravating factors allow for the individualising of a sentence, based on the 
existence of mitigating factors that could justify a lesser sentence; while aggravating factors 
could justify the imposition of a more severe sentence.529 There are no complete lists of either 
aggravating or mitigating factors.530  
The main aggravating factors identified in the cases above were: 
 The gravity/seriousness of the offence; 
 The trend that more juveniles are committing serious violent crimes; 
 The victims were juveniles under the age of 16 years; 
 Escalation in the number of rape and murder crimes and public outcry in cases where 
too lenient a sentence has been imposed; and 
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 The accused had previously displayed unacceptable behaviour. 
The main mitigating factors identified in the cases above were: 
 Youthfulness; 
 The possibility of rehabilitation; 
 First-time offender; 
 Unfavourable social circumstances of the accused; 
 Intoxication; and 
 The accused acting under the influence of his adult co-accused. 
From the analysis on the reported cases it is submitted that the seriousness of the offence was 
the most important aggravating factor taken into account by the sentencer in determining an 
appropriate sentence.  The youthfulness and the possibility of successful rehabilitation were 
the most important mitigating factors taken into account by the sentencer. S 69(1)(b) of the 
CJA531 expressly states that during sentencing, the sentencer “must promote an individualised 
response which strikes a balance between the circumstances of the juvenile offender, the nature 
of the offence and the interests of society.” However, in twelve out of the sixteen cases 
considered above,532 the seriousness of the offence was found to be overemphasised at the 
expense of the youthfulness of the accused. S 69(2) of the CJA533 empowers sentencers to 
impose sentences of a restorative justice nature and in combination.  
Van der Merwe534 noted that, when a sentencer fails to identify the existence of a particular 
factor, or wrongly recognises it, or attaches the incorrect weight to it, the sentencing process 
becomes unbalanced, and the sentencing decision may be overturned on appeal.   From the 
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analysis on the reported cases it is submitted that ten out of the sixteen cases were appeal or 
review cases. S 84535 and s 85536 of CJA applies to appeals and automatic review of certain 
convictions and sentences.  It is submitted that this indicates sentencers eager willingness to 
impose detention sentencers on juvenile offenders which in turn requires the juvenile justice 
system to re-evaluate the sentences imposed to ensure that the sentencing objective537 of the 
CJA538 were adhere to and that the rights539 of the juvenile offender were adequately protected 
and balanced in regard to the offence committed.    
The sentencers relied heavily on the increasingly high-incidence rate of violent sexual crimes 
committed against women and children, which influenced the length of sentences imposed.  
The sentencers imposed imprisonment sentences in fourteen out of sixteen reported cases,540 
ranging from nine to twenty years on accused who were between the ages of 16 and 18 years 
at the time of the commission of the crime. Two of these cases imposed life imprisonment 
sentences. This indicates the sentencers over-reliance on the imposition of imprisonment 
sentences. This is a direct violation of S 69(1)(e) of the CJA541 which states that “the use of 
imprisonment may only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible 
period.” Interestingly, the minimum sentence imposed for an adult first offender is ten years’ 
imprisonment. This indicates that there is little deviation in the length of sentences imposed 
                                                 
535 S 84(1)(a) and S84(1)(b) respectively expressly states “that an appeal by a juvenile against conviction, sentence 
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under the CJA542 and that of the CLAA.543 Similarly, there seems to be little deviation between 
the sentences imposed on juveniles and those that are imposed on adults. S 69(4) of the CJA544 
requires a sentencer to take account of the following factors: 
 “The amount of harm done or risked through the offence;”545 
 “The culpability of the child in causing or risking the harm;”546 
 “The protection of the community;”547 
 “The severity of the impact of the offence on the victim;”548 
 “The previous failure of the child to respond to non-residential alternatives, if 
applicable;”549 and 
 “The desirability of keeping the child out of prison.”550  
The research indicates that sentencers tend to place significant weight on S 69(4)(a)(i) and S 
69(4)(c) of the CJA551 while ignoring or attaching insignificant weight on S 69(4)(a)(ii), S 
69(4)(e) of the CJA,552 causing an imbalance in the determination of a sentence. The life 
imprisonment sentences imposed on the two juveniles is also a direct violation of the 
precedence established in S v Brandt553 and S v Nkosi,554 which held that life imprisonment 
may never be imposed on a juvenile offender.   
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S 69(2) of the CJA555 expressly “states in order to promote the objectives of sentencing as set 
out in s 69(1) of the Act, and to encourage a restorative justice approach, sentences may be 
used in combination.” From the analysis on the reported cases it is submitted that only five of 
the sixteen reported cases imposed suspended imprisonment sentences. This indicates that the 
sentencers failed to find an optimal combination in the imposition of sentences, and failed to 
ensure that imprisonment is only for the ‘shortest possible period’ by the minimal use of 
suspended imprisonment sentences. It is submitted that suspended sentences are an ideal 
alternative and optimal combination in the imposition of sentences. It ensures that juvenile 
offenders are only imprisoned as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period, 
while being rehabilitative and integrative in nature as it allows the juvenile offender to repent 
and amend for his offence/s within the community while ensuring that should he re-offend he 
will serve an imprisonment sentence and rightly so.  
From the analysis on the reported cases it is found that in only two out of the sixteen cases 
imposed a sentence of compulsorily attendance at a child and youth care centre in terms of s 
76 of the CJA.556 It is submitted that sentencers are more willing to impose a direct 
imprisonment sentence than compulsory attendance at a child and youth care centre.  This is 
problematic since these centres, although they are relatively small and scarce, they allow the 
juvenile to be remove from society for a period of time while being supervised, guided and 
treated.557 Compulsory attendance at a child and youth centre is not only preventative but also 
rehabilitative and integrative in nature.  
The courts have acknowledged that they are tasked with imposing sentences that deter society 
from committing crimes, and, should the courts fail to do so, society will lose faith in the 
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criminal justice system. However, the findings above indicates that, although the CJA558 was 
promulgated to protect juveniles in conflict with the law, proper implementation of the CJA559 
is required. For proper implementation to occur, it is submitted that the relevant parties and 
institutions must be schooled on the rights, objectives and procedures inherent in the CJA.560  
4.12.3.3. Pre-CJA vs Post-CJA  
Upon investigation of the sentences imposed, the writer concludes the following: 
Sentencers willingly imposed imprisonment sentences on juvenile offenders prior to the 
promulgation of the CJA, however they did acknowledge that juvenile offenders require 
different treatment to adult offenders hence the tendency of sentencers to establish juvenile 
sentencing guidelines by way of precedence.  It is submitted that this forward thinking must 
have contributed significantly to the promulgation and eventual implementation of the CJA.561  
Although the CJA562 brought about significant change regarding the sentencing of juvenile 
offenders, sentencers tend to over rely on imprisonment sentences, justifying the seriousness 
of the offence at the expense of the youthfulness of the juvenile offender.  This contributed a 
grave violations of the sentencing objectives set out in s 69 of the CJA563 and the rights of 
juvenile as contained in s 28 of the Constitution.564  
The following chapter will give an overview of the research study conducted, and will seek to 
provide the reader with recommendations as possible solutions to the problems identified.  
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5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide solutions to the key areas identified from proceeding chapters, 
and to conclude this study. An overview of sentencing principles applicable to juvenile 
offenders has been provided, with an analysis of the CJA565 operation and implementation for 
juvenile offenders who have committed serious crimes. The research has indicated that the 
majority of sentencers have imposed lengthy detention sentences for juveniles who have 
committed serious crimes in violation of the constitutional principle that juvenile detention 
must be “measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period.”  It was argued that the 
principle: “juvenile detention should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible 
period” is not only vague, but creates inconsistency during sentencing, owing to its inability to 
give objective sentencing guidelines; and the operation of excessively wide judicial 
discretion.566 This amounts to numerous appeals and reviews of sentences, while children’s 
rights are not upheld in the most stringent manner as required by the Constitution and 
international instruments. 
5.2. Conclusions drawn from the sentences imposed since the implementation 
of the Child Justice Act 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate the legislative sentencing principles for juveniles 
aged 14 years and older who have committed serious crimes.  This dissertation questioned 
whether the constitutional entrenchment of juvenile rights and the promulgation of the CJA567 
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had made any substantial difference in the types of sentences and sentence duration imposed 
on juveniles who commit serious crimes.   
Detention of juveniles has been an area of great concern worldwide. International instruments 
endorsed by South Africa contributed to the promulgation of children’s rights under the 
Constitution.568 These international instruments, namely, the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of a Child,569 United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child,570 United Nations 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,571 United Nations Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty,572 and Beijing Rules,573 provide a general 
framework within which juvenile justice should operate, while encouraging constant 
assessment and development of such systems to adapt and evolve to fully meet children’s 
rights.574 These instruments all share a common objective, which requires detention for juvenile 
delinquents to be a “measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period.” 
The Constitution575 brought about change regarding the treatment of juvenile delinquents in 
conflict with the law under s 28. Section 28 emphasises that the “best interests of the child is 
of paramount importance apropos of every matter affecting the child, including detention.” 
More importantly, s 28 (1) (g) expressly provides that “juveniles may only be detained as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period.”   
Notwithstanding this provision, past sentencing practice has shown an over-reliance on the use 
of detention sentences in South Africa.  Suspended sentences is a sentence which has been 
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imposed, in all the detail requires for the proper imposition of such sentence, but the operation 
of which is suspended for s specific term, subject to the offender’s fulfilling the conditions on 
which the suspension has been based. It is submitted that suspended sentences coupled with 
correctional supervision576 are an ideal alternative to the in the imposition of imprisonment 
sentences. It ensures that juvenile offenders are only imprisoned as a measure of last resort and 
for the shortest possible period, while being rehabilitative and integrative in nature as it allows 
the juvenile offender to repent and amend for his offence/s within the community while 
ensuring that should he re-offend he will serve an imprisonment sentence and rightly so. 
Furthermore it is submitted that compulsory attendance at child and youth centres are a better 
alternative to an imprisonment sentence. Because, although these child and youth care centres 
are relatively small and scarce, they allow the juvenile to be remove from society for a period 
of time while being supervised, guided and treated.  Compulsory attendance at a child and 
youth centre is not only preventative but also rehabilitative and integrative in nature and free 
of all the negative effects of adult prisons.  
The CJA577 was promulgated to create a separate criminal justice system that is au fait with the 
rights and needs of juvenile delinquents, coming into effect in 2010. According to the CJA,578 
“a child is any person under the age of 18 years and, in certain circumstances, this means a 
person who is 18 years or older but under the age of 21 years.”579 The main objective is to 
divert juvenile delinquents away from the criminal justice system by means of restorative 
justice conditioning to prevent re-offending.580  However, the CJA581 acknowledges that 
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diversion may be unsuitable, inadequate and unsuccessful, hence the creation of child justice 
courts for sentencing juvenile delinquents.582 
The CJA583 was correct in opting to note the age when the juvenile offender committed the 
offence, since South Africa is notorious for its lengthy court rolls and trial delays. The CJA584 
should also be commended on its inherent appeal and review procedures which have restored 
juvenile justice where the trial courts erred in their judgement to impose lengthy detention 
sentences in violation of constitutionally entrenched juvenile rights.    
Chapter 4, however, indicated that courts still impose detention sentences in the majority of 
cases, irrespective of the age of the offender.  It is submitted that entrenchment of juvenile 
rights and the promulgation of the CJA585 has not made any significant difference with regard 
to the imposition of detention sentences on juveniles convicted of serious crimes. There seems 
to be no difference in the length of sentences imposed or no significant difference between the 
sentences imposed for the juvenile accused and his adult co-accused.  It is submitted that the 
seriousness of the offence is still considered the most important aggravating factor justifying 
the use of detention sentences at the expense of the youth of the juvenile.   
This dissertation argued that alternatives to detention can and should be imposed in appropriate 
circumstances. The courts have endorsed this submission on numerous occasions. In N v S586 
the court noted that detention should only be allowed if there is no alternative sentence.  
The case law discussed throughout this dissertation demonstrates a genuine commitment by 
sentencers towards the interpretation and implementation of juvenile rights, as contained in the 
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Constitution and CJA.587 The sentencers have begun to advance the law’s understanding of a 
juvenile’s autonomy, however, the ideal that no juvenile should ever see the inside of a prison, 
is an area that can and should be developed further.   
5.3. The Netherlands justice system and the Bos-polaris sentencing guidelines 
The Dutch criminal law and juvenile justice system operates similarly to the South African 
criminal law and juvenile justice system, except for mandatory sentences.588  
The Dutch criminal law and procedure are based on three concepts, namely:  
 The principle of legitimacy;  
 Two, proportionality: questioning the relationship between the transgression and the 
proposed penalty; and  
 Three, subsidiary: questioning whether there are less punitive methods or penalties 
available. The principle of subsidiary is highly restorative in nature; however, the Dutch 
criminal law is primarily reserved for serious offences and for violation of fundamental 
interests.589  
Dutch sentencing is essentially a distributive system, allowing authorities to make sentencing 
decisions at every level of the system.590 For example, the police under prosecutorial 
supervision are authorised to offer a fine in the case of non-serious traffic violations.591  By 
paying the fine, the offender pleads guilty and the case will be dismissed.592  In juvenile justice, 
the police are authorised to divert juvenile delinquents to a diversion programme in cases of 
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petty offences, such as vandalism, shoplifting and non-serious violence. 593 Participation by the 
youngster and his guardians must be voluntary.594 The diversion programme includes four to 
eight hours community service as well as compensation to the victim.595 These diversion 
programs have been developed to react speedily to juvenile delinquency through mild but 
immediate sentences.596 The legal provision is an informal conditional dismissal; if the juvenile 
delinquent satisfies the requirement, the police will drop the case, if not they will refer the case 
to the prosecutor.597 This mirrors the South African juvenile justice system operation for petty 
juvenile offences. The public prosecutor is a central figure in the Dutch justice system and has 
extensive powers.598  The prosecutor is seen as mixture as mixture of a civil servant and 
magistrate.599 The prosecutor has large discretion to prosecute since the Dutch system is based 
on the principle of opportunity, which gives him the power to prosecute or not.600  
The Dutch Penal Code sets out a wide range of sentences that can be imposed, ranging from 
fines, task penalties to detention.601  The statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment is one 
day and this applies to all crimes irrespective of the level of seriousness.602  The statutory 
maximum imprisonment is 15 years, which can be extended to 20 years for the crime of 
murder.603  Life sentences can be imposed for murder cases but they are rare and be substituted 
with a fixed sentence of 20 years.604  In practice where life sentences are imposed they are 
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always converted to a specific period of time by way of a pardon.605  The Code of Criminal 
Procedure provides that fines should be given preference over detention sentences and requires 
a sentencer to give an explanation when a detention sentence is imposed.606  Fines can be 
imposed for any offence, including murder but tend to be imposed for less serious, non-violent 
offences.607  
Dutch sentencing statistics shows an overall clear and continuous reduction in detention 
sentences from 1837 to 1975.608 Since 1975 the rates have been steadily increasing with only 
a minor interruption in 1987.609 Analysts attribute the prime consequence in the changing of 
sentencing patterns is the reduction of court-sanctioned fines and the reduction of suspended 
detention sentences.610 The largest difference concerns the imposition of community sanctions.  
In 1994 community sanctions account for approximately 60% of all sanctions imposed on 
juveniles, while they accounted for approximately 16% in adult crimes.611  One third of all 
adult sentences consists of partial detention, while detention sentences for juveniles are only 
10%.612 The difference in fines imposed has to do with the fact that fines are generally paid by 
guardians, hence juvenile judges do not consider them as effective sentences.613  
Sentencing guidelines have a harmonising effect, by binding prosecutors and sentencers to its 
guidelines, greater consistency is achieved.614  If the guidelines are effectively applied, it will 
lead to the development of a more just sentencing policy.615 The basic point of departure of 
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guidelines is that it serves to structure the freedom of discretion of the sentencers and that 
guidelines are to be followed in the standard case.616 The guidelines itself thus grants the 
possibility for diversion in ‘non-standard’ cases.617  The principle of equality requires that ‘non-
standard’ cases should in fact be treated differently in order to guarantee equality.618Since the 
deviation from certain guidelines is subjected to judicial control, the offender is protected from 
the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the prosecutor.619 Hence the promulgation of the bos-
polaris sentencing guidelines, which was intended to be an easily accessible system allowing 
various offences to form part of a framework which would ultimately follow a similar structure 
in the determination of the imposition of sentences.620   
The bos-polaris is a set of sentencing guidelines utilised by the Dutch to enable prosecutors 
actively and objectively to determine an appropriate sentence for the offender, based on all the 
relevant facts of the case, which they will suggest to the sentencer.621 The sentencer is not 
obliged to impose the suggested sentences; however, few sentencers deviate from such 
sentencing suggestions.622  
The bos-polaris sentencing guideline is based on a mathematical equation.  Specific crimes 
have been designated a base-line number of points which will be further calculated according 
to  the existence of mitigating and aggravating factors each designated a number value, to 
calculate the actual number of points the offender has accumulated for the commission of his 
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crime.623 The number value the equation delivers will then specify the number of days’ 
imprisonment, the value of the fine, or the hours of rehabilitation the offender must complete.624  
The general aggravating factors are reoffending, presence of concurrent offences, and the 
committal of an offence while occupying a public office.625 The presence of these factors 
justifies a 1/3 increase in sentence if a prescribed statutory maximum sentence exists for a 
particular offence.626 In addition, reoffending allows for a 10% increase in points; while 
multiple reoffending allows for a 20% increase in points, designated in the bos-polaris 
sentencing guidelines.627    
The general mitigating factor is youth.628 However, there is no complete list of either 
aggravating or mitigating factors. 
The bos-polaris sentencing guideline serves to structure the freedom of discretion; and must 
be followed in a standard case. The bos-polaris system allows for individualisation of 
sentences. It accounts for all of the facts of the case, factors of sentencing, and the available 
sentences. It contains an inherent safeguard, allowing the sentencer to deviate from seemingly 
inappropriate sentence suggestions by the prosecution, 629provided that the deviation is 
reasonable and advisable, and that the sentencer records reasons for such a sentence seeming 
inappropriate.630 These deviations must be temporary, and must be consistently applied.631 
Should a motivated deviation regularly occur, it will indicate the need for legislative reform to 
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enable the sentencing guidelines to adhere to the present intolerance stand taken against the 
specific crime/s.632  
Statistics indicate that prosecutors and sentencers agreed in 97% of the cases on the verdict of 
guilty with or without punishment, acquittal or discharge633.  As to the nature of the sentence, 
agreement reached is 80%.634 In some cases the sentencer imposed additional sentences, such 
as community service or a fine; in others, the sentencer imposed community service instead of 
detention.635  The data also indicated that in the majority of cases, deviation from the 
prosecutor’s sentence demand results in a less severe sentence: fines are lower, the length of 
the sentence is reduced, and in some instances detention was replaced with community service 
orders.636  
The Dutch juvenile justice system allows for diversion at various levels; however, should an 
offence be of a serious nature, the juvenile will be referred to a children’s court at which the 
imposition of a sentence will follow.637 The jurisdiction of a children’s court allows for the 
imposition of a task, penalty, fine, or detention, as sentences.638  
The Dutch juvenile justice system follows a basic sentencing guideline, (very similar to the 
bos-polaris sentencing guideline discussed above) which prescribes the following guidelines 
for sentences:  
 A task penalty may vary from 200 hours or less community service, a 200-hour or less 
training order, or a combination of community service and a training order not 
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exceeding 240 hours. Should the juvenile default, the children’s court would be justified 
in imposing a detention sentence not exceeding 4 months;639  
 A fine may range from €3 but not exceed €3350, which has to be paid by the juvenile 
and not his/her parents, over a period of 2 years.  Should the juvenile default, the 
children’s court would be justified in imposing a detention sentence not exceeding 3 
months;640 
 A re-education order may be imposed for a period not less than 6 months but not 
exceeding 12 months. The training order will be served under a foster family qualified 
to assist in the reconditioning of antisocial behaviour, criminal behaviour, or serious 
emotional disorders. These orders may only be extended by 1 year after an evaluation 
of the juvenile current behaviour and psychology has been observed641; and 
 A minimum of one day imprisonment is allowed. Juveniles under the age of 16 years 
may only be imprisoned for 12 months or less, while juveniles under the age of 18 years 
may only be imprisoned for 24 months or less. However, committal or detention will 
only be justified after 2 reports by a probation officer or behavioural scientists have 
been furnished. An extension of a detention sentence will only be allowed for violent 
or sexual offences or owing to juveniles suffering from mental disease or defect, but is 
limited to 2 years upon the request of the prosecutor, and such a request being heard by 
a panel of 3 judges.  
The Dutch juvenile justice trends are fairly similar to what has been seen in the adult system.642  
The standard practice for the police and the prosecutor to simply drop charges in the case of 
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petty offences has drastically reduced.643  The police will increasingly drop the charges only 
on condition that compensation en restitution to the victim.644 Similarly the prosecutor will 
increasingly impose a sentence in the form of a fine, compensation or community service as a 
condition for dropping the charges.645  Statistics indicated that between 1985 and 1995 the 
number of juveniles sentenced to detention did not change much.646  Annually only one fifth 
of the 6000 juvenile who appeared before a juvenile judge were sentenced to imprisonment.647  
The Dutch penal law allows 16 to 18 year old juveniles to be tried in an adult court, this 
accounted for 5-6% of these juvenile delinquents to be sentenced to imprisonment, while in 
1985 17.7%, and in 1995 19% of juveniles were imprisoned.648  However, the proportion of 
suspended sentences increased from 17.3% in 1985 to 31.3% in 1995 indicating the juvenile 
justice system willingness to rehabilitate and reintegrate juvenile delinquents.649 Upon 
consideration of the nature of the offences, judges were dealing with relatively more violent 
offences in 1995 (24%) than in 1985 (14%).650 Another indication that the Dutch juvenile 
justice system is restorative justice in nature, allowing even serious offences to avoid 
detention.651  
In 1983 community service was introduced for juvenile delinquents together with a treatment 
order.652  A treatment order consisted of a three-month very structured and strict training 
program, based on behavioural techniques, social skills training and vocational training.653  
This was used in relatively serious offences as an alternative.654 Of all juvenile sentences in 
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1996, 60% were alternative sanctions, by 1998 the proportion had increased to approximately 
70%.655  Due to the positive evaluations, namely their ability to recondition gaps in the 
offender’s social functioning, combining training and intensive supervision orders were 
extended to young adults.656  
The Dutch judiciary makes use of the Consistent Sentencing Database (hereafter CST).657  This 
is an electronic database that contains information on sentences passed in previous cases.658  
The system uses type of offences, criminal history and ages as the basic criteria for identifying 
similar cases and the sentences imposed therein.659  It is submitted that the CST will allow for 
further sentence consistency and equality as it enables sentencers to treat similar cases alike, 
due to the CST ease of access, instant and structured results. 
5.4. Recommendations 
The legislature should provide an objective juvenile sentencing guideline to limit the operation 
of excessively wide judicial discretion; which would combat the vagueness sentencers 
experience of the principle that juvenile detention should be a measure of last resort and for the 
shortest possible period.   
The Dutch are renowned worldwide for their liberal sentencing regime promoting restorative 
justice practices and their low detention rates.660 It is recommended that the legislature should 
opt to create an objective juvenile sentencing guideline which is based on the Dutch bos-polaris 
sentencing guidelines.  The bos-polaris sentencing guidelines is favoured as it is based on a 
mathematical equation.  Specific crimes have been designated a base-line number of points 
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which will be further calculated according to  the existence of mitigating and aggravating 
factors that are designated a number value to conclude the actual number of points the offender 
has accumulated for the commission of his crime.661 The number value the equation delivers 
will then specify the number of days’ imprisonment, the value of the fine, or the hours of 
rehabilitation the offender must serve.662 It is thus recommended that the legislature adjust the 
bos-polaris sentencing guidelines, by dividing the number value the equation delivers by two, 
as international instruments663 encourage a sentence imposed on juvenile offenders to be 
roughly half of the sentence imposed on an adult committing the same offence.  Furthermore, 
it is recommended that the sentencer should objectively interpret the principle that ‘juvenile 
detention should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period’ by giving 
punitive preference to the value of a fine and/or hours of rehabilitation the offender must 
complete, the number the equation delivers. It is recommended that, should the case call for 
imprisonment, the sentencer must impose imprisonment in combination with rehabilitation, as 
this will allow for positive re-conditioning of the offender’s behaviour, whilst deterring such 
conduct in the future. This recommendation will be in line with S 69(1)(a) of the CJA664 which 
states that the sentencer must “encourage the juvenile delinquent to understand the 
implications of and be accountable for the harm caused during sentencing and in line with S 
69(1)(d) of the CJA665 to ensure that any necessary supervision, guidance, treatment or services 
which form part of the sentence assist the juvenile delinquent in the process of reintegration.”  
An optimal sentence for a highly serious offence will impose a fine, rehabilitation, and limited 
detention, as it will allow the offender to make restitution, promote positive behavioural 
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conditioning, and prevent and deter similar criminal conduct. Also, it is recommended that the 
juvenile sentencing guideline contain an inherent limitation, that sentencers may only impose 
concurrent detention sentences, as opposed to consecutive sentences, to combat the excessive 
accumulation of sentences on juvenile delinquents. Concurrent sentences ensure that the 
juveniles exposure to the negative prison environment will be limited, providing society a 
greater opportunity to regain a functional and law abiding member of society.  
The CJA666 expressly cautions the relevant parties that “detention should be a measure of last 
resort and for the shortest possible period; and that current statutory law does not effectively 
approach the plight of juveniles in conflict with the law in a comprehensive and integrated 
manner, taking into account their vulnerability and special needs.” The CJA667 also expressly 
acknowledges that “there are capacity, resource, and other constraints on the state which may 
require a practical and incremental strategy to implement the new criminal justice system for 
juveniles.” Hence, it is submitted that the CJA668 will encourage and endorse the juvenile 
sentencing guideline recommended above.   
It is recommended that restorative justice sentences669 should be emphasised and endorsed 
amongst sentencers. As outlined above, the CJA670 is primarily based on the premise that 
restorative justice will allow for the rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile offenders. 
Terblanche and Rabie have frequently asserted that juveniles are more prone to rehabilitation 
than adults; and that research has found juvenile rehabilitation to be highly successful in 
appropriate cases.  
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It is recommended that sentencers be educated on the benefits inherent in restorative justice 
sentences. A sentencing information system, similar to the Ductch CST database, can provide 
sentencers with information regarding the range of penalties imposed by child justice courts 
nationwide for similar offences, while periodic information regarding alternative restorative 
sentences may be circulated to continually recommend and emphasise the use of these 
sentences. It is submitted that the CST will allow for further sentence consistency and equality 
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